Introduction

On 17 July 2018, former US president Barack Obama was invited to give the Nelson Mandela Annual Lecture in Johannesburg. In his speech, he warned that:

Obviously, Obama did not use the terms ‘illiberal democracy’, ‘neoauthoritarianism’ or ‘populism’ (or other terms which currently dominate social-science scholarship and media reporting), but he certainly put his finger on the drastic socio-political changes that have been taking place globally, including in EU member states, specifically since the so-called ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015 (Rheindorf and Wodak, 2018).

Indeed, as a study on ‘Fear not values’ conducted by de Vries and Hoffmann (2016) in eight EU member states illustrates, over 50% of the voters for far-right parties viewed globalisation as the major threat in the future. Moreover, 53% of those who fear globalisation perceive migration as the major global challenge, and 54% display anti-foreigner sentiments. In a similar vein, political scientist Ivan Krastev concludes in his widely acknowledged essay Europadammerung (2017: 48– 49) that the ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015 might eventually lead to the destruction of the EU.

Although many politicians at EU and national levels, as well as other prominent public intellectuals, are explicitly warning against the European and global drift towards more (ethno-)nationalism, illiberal democracies and authoritarianism – and thus against violations of human rights, international treaties and EU norms and values (for example, Otmar Karas, Emmanuel Macron, and Jurgen Habermas) – official responses on the part of the EU have been slow and follow complex, institutionally defined procedures (Article 7 of the European Treaty). Along these lines, Grabbe and Lehne (2017b: 8) state that: