I. Introduction

This chapter introduces the two views of NPE that will be the focus of the book. I first describe in more detail the reductionist reading of NPE. Next, I examine the principal lines of textual evidence to which reductionists appeal to support their view. I conclude from this examination that the textual case for reductionism falls well short of being persuasive. Lastly, I set forth the view of NPE that I will defend throughout the book. I maintain that NPE is the assertion that there are no extrinsic denominations of a thing that are not included in the concept of that thing.

II. The Reductionist Reading

In order to get clear on the reductionist interpretation of NPE, we must first understand how reductionists, on Leibniz’s behalf, define the term “extrinsic denomination” and its companion term “intrinsic denomination.” Leibniz never favors us with an explicit definition of either term, but interpreters appear fairly confident that they can reconstruct Leibniz’s understanding of these terms from the way he employs them in various contexts. Mates’s reconstruction of these terms is perhaps the most precise:

So, for example, the denomination expressed by the definite description “the father of Solomon” would be an extrinsic denomination of David, as the description refers to an individual (viz., Solomon) other than David; whereas, the denomination expressed by the description “a man” would be an intrinsic denomination of David, since (apparently) the description makes no reference to other individuals.