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16 - Standard-setting organisations

Current policy issues and empirical evidence

from Part V - International standardisation and innovation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 December 2015

By
Neil Gandal  and
Pierre Régibeau
Edited by
Panagiotis Delimatsis
Panagiotis Delimatsis
Affiliation:
Universiteit van Tilburg, The Netherlands
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The Law, Economics and Politics of International Standardisation , pp. 394 - 433
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2015

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References

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