Introduction

We have suggested that there are, so to speak, three hot spots where we can locate the keys to regulatory effectiveness and ineffectiveness. In this chapter, our focus is on the first of these loci, the actions of regulators themselves.

We will recall that, in Stuart Biegel’s analysis, we saw the significance of regulators being smart and intelligent. However, this is just one of a number of desiderata. To be sure, we need our regulators to be competent and professional, but also we need them to act with integrity. Accordingly, we start by sketching three pathologies: where regulators are corrupt (section 2), where they are captured (section 3), and where they are incompetent (in a broad and inclusive sense) (section 4).

Having sketched these indicators of regulatory character and capacity, we will focus on two test cases of regulator failure: i rst, data protection (section 5) and, secondly, nanomaterials (section 6). In the i rst case, even though regulators have tried to put in place a dedicated regime for data protection in a rapidly developing information society, it is arguable that a lack of clarity of purpose coupled with rapid changes in the underlying technologies has frustrated their efforts to deliver ef ective regulation. In the latter case, the problem is rather different: here the story of regulatory failure turns on regulatory inaction – that is, regulators have failed to adjust existing provisions for health, safety and the environment in ways that both engage with nanomaterials and recognise the promise of this embryonic sector of technology.