Linguistic and conceptual representation: how close are they?

This chapter is based on the assumption that linguistic and conceptual processes tend towards isomorphism rather than, say, identity. This is, first, because notions of system economy suggest that there is a single master blueprint for all cognitive processes; any differences (leading to isomorphism, therefore, and not full identity) come about to the extent that the various processes operate with different inputs, function differently, or whatever. Secondly, a reasonable view of the developmental process would suggest that the child comes genetically equipped, to some extent, not only for language but also for other kinds of conceptualization. Just as specific language development is then further guided by the specific linguistic environment of the child, so are the other kinds of conceptual development guided and moulded by the child's cognitive environment, for example the cultural, social, and educational circumstances. Thirdly, linguistic and conceptual development are not merely parallel processes but are intimately intertwined at all stages, giving further support to the notion that they must be isomorphic. I propose to provide some indication that such isomorphism may well be the case by showing how an account of the conceptual representation underlying discourse seems to provide a unified explanation for the many different uses of the item would. First, though, I'll briefly look at a handful of cases where would doesn't get used.