We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 March 2010
INTRODUCTION
Isaac Levi's work has had what seems to be a lasting impact on several fields of philosophical inquiry. I am myself one of the many philosophers on whom he has had a decisive influence. His book Gambling with Truth was one of the major inspirations that led me to study philosophy, and I have continued to be an eager reader of his books and articles.
In this contribution I focus on Isaac Levi's choice of formal structures for the representation of beliefs. This aspect of his work exemplifies his influence; a large group of reseachers in decision theory and formal epistemology have either followed his proposals or taken them as starting points for their own developments. Since philosophy proceeds by criticism rather than by praise, I focus on what I perceive as possible problems and needs for clarification.
TWO TYPES OF IDEALIZATION
The representation of philosophical subject matter in formal language is always the outcome of an idealization. There are two types of idealization that should be carefully distinguished between, although they are often intertwined. First, to idealize can mean to simplify for the sake of clarity. The resulting formal model is an ideal in the sense of “[s]omething existing only as a mental conception” (Oxford English Dictionary).
To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected] is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.
To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.
To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.
