Book contents
- Kant’s Tribunal of Reason
- Kant’s Tribunal of Reason
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Acknowledgements
- Abbreviations
- Introduction
- Chapter 1 The Critique of Pure Reason as the Establishment of Reason’s Lawful Condition
- Chapter 2 The Normativity of Law
- Chapter 3 The Transcendental Deduction of the Categories and the Tradition of Legal Deductions
- Chapter 4 The Question of Fact and the Question of Law in Judicial Imputation and in the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories
- Chapter 5 The Tribunal of Reason
- Chapter 6 Moral Conscience as the Practical Inner Tribunal
- Chapter 7 Distinguishing between Rightful Claims and Groundless Pretensions
- Chapter 8 Epistemic Authority as both Individual and Collectively Shared
- Chapter 9 Systematicity and Philosophy as the Legislation of Reason
- Conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index
Chapter 3 - The Transcendental Deduction of the Categories and the Tradition of Legal Deductions
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 February 2020
Book contents
- Kant’s Tribunal of Reason
- Kant’s Tribunal of Reason
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Acknowledgements
- Abbreviations
- Introduction
- Chapter 1 The Critique of Pure Reason as the Establishment of Reason’s Lawful Condition
- Chapter 2 The Normativity of Law
- Chapter 3 The Transcendental Deduction of the Categories and the Tradition of Legal Deductions
- Chapter 4 The Question of Fact and the Question of Law in Judicial Imputation and in the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories
- Chapter 5 The Tribunal of Reason
- Chapter 6 Moral Conscience as the Practical Inner Tribunal
- Chapter 7 Distinguishing between Rightful Claims and Groundless Pretensions
- Chapter 8 Epistemic Authority as both Individual and Collectively Shared
- Chapter 9 Systematicity and Philosophy as the Legislation of Reason
- Conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
This chapter is an investigation of the quid juris metaphor that introduces the transcendental deduction. It focuses on the parallel with legal deductions and the importance of this parallel for the transcendental deduction as a philosophical argument. This importance is explored through an analysis of the analogy between concepts and property, the quid juris metaphor and the historical background of deduction writings in Prussia. This analysis leads Møller to reject Henrich’s understanding of the transcendental deduction as a loosely structured proof of an origin.
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- Kant's Tribunal of ReasonLegal Metaphor and Normativity in the <I>Critique of Pure Reason</I>, pp. 52 - 64Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2020