Book contents
- Kant’s Reform of Metaphysics
- Kant’s Reform of Metaphysics
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- Abbreviations
- Introduction
- Chapter 1 Wolff, Crusius, and Kant
- Chapter 2 The “Thorny Paths of Critique”
- Chapter 3 Ontology, Metaphysics, and Transcendental Philosophy
- Chapter 4 Things in Themselves, Transcendental Objects, and Monads
- Chapter 5 The 1781 Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding
- Chapter 6 The Schematism of the Pure Understanding
- Chapter 7 Transcendental Reflection
- Chapter 8 Kant’s Projected System of Pure Reason
- Conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index of Names
- Index of Subjects
Chapter 6 - The Schematism of the Pure Understanding
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 20 August 2020
- Kant’s Reform of Metaphysics
- Kant’s Reform of Metaphysics
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- Abbreviations
- Introduction
- Chapter 1 Wolff, Crusius, and Kant
- Chapter 2 The “Thorny Paths of Critique”
- Chapter 3 Ontology, Metaphysics, and Transcendental Philosophy
- Chapter 4 Things in Themselves, Transcendental Objects, and Monads
- Chapter 5 The 1781 Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding
- Chapter 6 The Schematism of the Pure Understanding
- Chapter 7 Transcendental Reflection
- Chapter 8 Kant’s Projected System of Pure Reason
- Conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index of Names
- Index of Subjects
Summary
Chapter 6 seeks to establish that Kant’s account of the schematism of the pure understanding in the Critique of Pure Reason yields the same result as the transcendental deduction, but does so by approaching the question concerning the legitimate use of categories from the angle of time qua pure form of intuition. On my reading, Kant conceives of transcendental schemata and categories as different instances of the a priori rules that determine how the mind can unify a manifold at all. Since transcendental schemata present these rules as ways of unifying successive representations, they can be said to constitute the sensible condition of any a priori cognition of objects. I take Kant to argue that Wolffian metaphysics ought to use categories independently of this condition in order to establish itself as a purely intellectual discipline and, hence, that a priori judgments about the soul or God do not amount to cognitions of objects.
Keywords
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- Information
- Kant's Reform of MetaphysicsThe <I>Critique of Pure Reason</I> Reconsidered, pp. 163 - 190Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2020