The Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals is the first work in which Kant speaks explicitly of conceptual ‘transitions’ from one sphere or domain to another. But Kant never made clear precisely how these transitions are to be understood or what their systematic function within the overall structure of the Groundwork ultimately is. No one disputes the fact that Kant always emphasised the central importance of systematic methodological considerations for philosophical reflection. In the Preface to the Groundwork itself, he refers explicitly to ‘the method employed in this text’ (Gr:392, 17) and to the ‘path’ he has pursued in relation to the entire project of a metaphysics of morals (Gr:392, 22). Whereas the Groundwork as a whole proceeds analytically, the metaphysics of morals he intends to publish ‘someday’ in the future will be constructed synthetically (Gr:391, 16). Kant says, it is true, that the internal structure of the Groundwork ‘turns out consequently’ as it actually does (Gr:392, 22, my italics), articulated clearly in its three well-known sections. But it is not immediately obvious why a specific transition [übergang] is involved in each of these sections. And nor, as we have pointed out, does Kant really explicate the character of these transitions any further.

In all the literature surrounding the Groundwork, we find that very little attention has been paid to this problem.