Kant's Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim presents an “idea” in Kant's technical sense of the term, namely, an a priori concept of reason (KrV A 312–38/B 368–96). The proper function of such concepts, in theoretical matters, is to regulate our rational inquiry with the aim of achieving maximal completeness and systematicity among our cognitions (KrV A 515–67/B 543–95, A 643–704/B 670–704732, A 832–51/B 860–79). Kant conceives of a rational system of cognitions as one in which reason sketches, in accordance with an idea, what it would be for our cognitions to attain to the greatest conceivable unity, systematicity and intelligibility, and then makes empirical inquiries, ordering the results in such a way as to fill in the sketch as far as the facts of nature and the limits of our cognitive capacities make this possible. In this essay, the topic is human history, and the idea in question is therefore an idea of a maximal theoretical intelligibility to human history. The results of this project may converge (as they finally do in the Ninth Proposition) with our practical strivings, motivated by moral considerations. But to regard Kant's main project in Idea for a Universal History as motivated by morality is totally to misunderstand the essay from the ground up.

PRELIMINARY: KANT'S FIRST THREE PROPOSITIONS

Human history is the collective result of people's free actions.