Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-gb8f7 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-22T14:04:56.021Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

5 - The moral law as causal law

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 August 2010

Jens Timmermann
Affiliation:
University of St Andrews, Scotland
Get access

Summary

A well-known gap exists in Kant's argument that the categorical imperative is the fundamental principle of morality. The gap is between the claim that rational agents act only on maxims that could serve as universal laws and the more substantial requirement contained in the categorical imperative. There does not appear to be any obvious route from the seemingly trivial requirement to conform to universally valid laws to the controversial and substantive requirement of acting only on maxims that one can at the same time will that all other rational agents act on. Kant apparently assumed that we conform our wills to universally valid laws only if we act on maxims that we can will to be universal laws, but many have pointed out he gives no defence of this assumption. In what follows, I focus on a preliminary step to connecting the two claims, the step that connects rational agency to conformity to universally valid laws. Why must the will of a rational agent, insofar as he is rational, be such that it is universally valid in any sense? My hope is that by first considering this question, some light can be shed on the nature of the remaining argument for the categorical imperative.

Many readers assume that for Kant, a rational agent must conform to universally valid laws because rational agency is rational, and rationality requires this sort of universal validity.

Type
Chapter
Information
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2009

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected] is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×