WHAT IS HAPPINESS?

Kant begins the Groundwork by putting happiness in its place. Happiness is not unconditionally good. Your happiness is not good unless you are worthy of happiness, and you are not worthy of happiness unless you have a good will. Right from the start, Kant has made it clear that the most important concept in ethics will be the good will, and he devotes the remainder of the Groundwork to elaborating and explaining what it is. This does not leave much room for happiness. But Kant does not neglect it altogether. In fact, he makes a number of intriguing suggestions, both about what happiness really is and the reasons, if any, we have to pursue it.

Kant first introduces happiness in the Groundwork as ‘that complete wellbeing and satisfaction with one's condition’ (G IV 393), and a little later links it with ‘enjoyment of life’ (G IV 396). What is satisfaction? We might think of it as a mental state of pleasure: a life of happiness is then a life of pleasure. Kant never explicitly explains what he takes satisfaction to be, but he does introduce a second conception of happiness, on which he concentrates in the rest of the Groundwork. On this second view, happiness is getting what you want, or more precisely, the idea of happiness is the idea of the sum total of inclinations (G IV 399, see also G IV 405, G IV 418).