Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Introduction
- Chronology
- Further reading
- Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals
- Preface
- Section I Transition from common rational to philosophic moral cognition
- Section II Transition from popular moral philosophy to metaphysics of morals
- Section III Transition from metaphysics of morals to the critique of pure practical reason
- Notes
- Selected glossary
- Index
- Title in the series
Section III - Transition from metaphysics of morals to the critique of pure practical reason
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Introduction
- Chronology
- Further reading
- Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals
- Preface
- Section I Transition from common rational to philosophic moral cognition
- Section II Transition from popular moral philosophy to metaphysics of morals
- Section III Transition from metaphysics of morals to the critique of pure practical reason
- Notes
- Selected glossary
- Index
- Title in the series
Summary
THE CONCEPT OF FREEDOM IS THE KEY TO THE EXPLANATION OF THE AUTONOMY OF THE WILL
Will is a kind of causality of living beings insofar as they are rational, and freedom would be that property of such causality that it can be efficient independently of alien causes determining it, just as natural necessity is the property of the causality of all nonrational beings to be determined to activity by the influence of alien causes.
The preceding definition of freedom is negative and therefore unfruitful for insight into its essence; but there flows from it a positive concept of freedom, which is so much the richer and more fruitful. Since the concept of causality brings with it that of laws in accordance with which, by something that we call a cause, something else, namely an effect, must be posited, so freedom, although it is not a property of the will in accordance with natural laws, is not for that reason lawless but must instead be a causality in accordance with immutable laws but of a special kind; for otherwise a free will would be an absurdity. Natural necessity was a heteronomy of efficient causes, since every effect was possible only in accordance with the law that something else determines the efficient cause to causality; what, then, can freedom of the will be other than autonomy, that is, the will's property of being a law to itself?
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- Information
- Kant: Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals , pp. 52 - 66Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1998
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