The question posed in the introductory chapter was whether constructive theory of the state and its policies is possible. The argument put forward here is that it is possible to cross the boundary between “is” and “ought”. It is not that we can in any way prove our normative premises, but that we can – on the basis of a few basic principles over which there can be widespread agreement – reason our way to certain rules which should govern the concrete design of our political institutions. What has made this enterprise possible is the use of institutional theory, for political institutions are both empirical and normative orders. This is not the place to repeat the results of the analysis in full, but rather to highlight a few major principles.

Firstly, according to some important new work in game theory, it seems impossible to explain why self-interested, utility-maximizing, and rational individuals ever chose to cooperate on a large scale. As, for example, Mark Irving Lichbach has shown, every explanation presented so far on how the problem of collective action can be solved, presupposes that it has already been solved. According to this literature, the only way to understand why large-scale political cooperation occurs, is to point at the political institution (i.e., the State) that existed before the game about choosing to cooperate or not ever got started.