Fought on Sunday 27 July 1214, the battle of Bouvines has attracted a great deal of attention from the Middle Ages to the twenty-first century. The battle's 800th anniversary less than a decade ago drew renewed scrutiny to it as a historical and military event. The purpose of this article is not to rehash the background, circumstances, the numbers of men engaged, the outcome or impact of the battle but rather to draw attention to a still understudied aspect of war in the High Middle Ages: how an individual commander actually func-tioned strategically, operationally, and tactically. While we cannot know what Philip was actually thinking, it is possible to see how he arrived at his decision to offer battle on a Sunday more than eight hundred years ago. This article seeks to understand how Philip II, who is not typically regarded by modern historians as a great battlefield general, presided over a great tactical victory with strategic implications at Bouvines, while arguing against the stereotype that the combat followed some sort of formalized rules or was merely a large-scale duel between armored mounted men.

Philip II's Grand Strategy

In his early military career up through the Third Crusade and beyond, Philip often appeared outgeneraled by his Angevin contemporaries and primary opponents King Henry II and his son Richard I of England. While John Hosler has successfully defended Philip's performance on the Third Crusade, back in France Philip never had much luck against Richard. After Richard's death in 1199 Philip experienced far more success against Richard's brother John, who was not the talented military commander Richard was.