Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Foreword by William B. Quandt
- Acknowledgements
- Prologue
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Kissinger's legacy and imprint on the Middle East
- Part I Jordan in the Carter Middle East policy
- Part II Jordan in the Reagan Middle East policy
- 6 The evolution of Reagan's strategy
- 7 The US, Israel and Jordan: collaboration and discord
- 8 Two cases of collaboration and discord
- 9 The US and Jordan: how ‘much’ became ‘too much’
- Part III US, Jordan and Arab approaches to peace
- Appendices
- Notes
- Select bibliography
- Index
- Cambridge Middle East Library
8 - Two cases of collaboration and discord
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 25 February 2010
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Foreword by William B. Quandt
- Acknowledgements
- Prologue
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Kissinger's legacy and imprint on the Middle East
- Part I Jordan in the Carter Middle East policy
- Part II Jordan in the Reagan Middle East policy
- 6 The evolution of Reagan's strategy
- 7 The US, Israel and Jordan: collaboration and discord
- 8 Two cases of collaboration and discord
- 9 The US and Jordan: how ‘much’ became ‘too much’
- Part III US, Jordan and Arab approaches to peace
- Appendices
- Notes
- Select bibliography
- Index
- Cambridge Middle East Library
Summary
The first half of this chapter focuses on the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, because of its destabilizing effects on the region as a whole, and therefore on Jordan. Its demonstration of the intrinsic weakness of US Middle East policy and of the dominance of Israeli influence over that policy make it an important factor in the overall US–Arab relationship. The second half of the chapter deals with the attempt to revive the US initiative with the launching of the Reagan Plan.
1982: The Israeli invasion of Lebanon
June 1982 witnessed a major act of war, as Israel embarked on a large-scale invasion of Lebanon. To achieve peace for Galilee by establishing a 25-mile security zone inside Lebanon was the first declared Israeli aim. But Galilee was already enjoying peace as a result of the July 1981 ceasefire negotiated by Philip Habib, the then US special envoy in the Middle East. It became increasingly clear that the declared original aim was a smoke screen for ulterior motives, as General Eitan, the Chief of Staff of the Israeli army, elaborated in Ha'aretzof 9 July:
The Israeli march into Lebanon was a part of the struggle over Eretz Israel. That is the point. This whole battle in Beirut, it is the struggle over Eretz Israel. A war against the enemy that has been fighting over Eretz Israel for a hundred years.
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- Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1993