Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Acknowledgement
- Map 1 The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan
- Map 2 Operations on the Jordanian Front, 5–7 June 1967
- Map 3 The Campaign in Jerusalem, 5–7 June 1967
- 1 The decision-making process in Jordan
- 2 The principles and practice of Jordanian foreign policy
- 3 Friends and enemies: Jordan in inter-Arab affairs
- 4 Samu
- 5 The gathering crisis
- 6 On the brink of war
- 7 The war
- 8 The war in perspective
- 9 The aftermath
- 10 Conclusion
- Appendix Timetable for the movement of Iraqi forces to Jordan
- Biographical note
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Acknowledgement
- Map 1 The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan
- Map 2 Operations on the Jordanian Front, 5–7 June 1967
- Map 3 The Campaign in Jerusalem, 5–7 June 1967
- 1 The decision-making process in Jordan
- 2 The principles and practice of Jordanian foreign policy
- 3 Friends and enemies: Jordan in inter-Arab affairs
- 4 Samu
- 5 The gathering crisis
- 6 On the brink of war
- 7 The war
- 8 The war in perspective
- 9 The aftermath
- 10 Conclusion
- Appendix Timetable for the movement of Iraqi forces to Jordan
- Biographical note
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
The war record
On 3 June King Hussein received the Turkish Ambassador who informed him that Israel would start its offensive on 5 or 6 June with an air strike on Egypt's air bases. According to Juma'a this information was confirmed by the Iraqi Ambassador who visited him on 4 June and told him that according to their information Israel would open hostilities the following morning, that is, on 5 June. Juma'a and the Iraqi Ambassador then visited King Hussein to inform him of this development. King Hussein immediately told Khammash who informed Riad of the news. At King Hussein's request it was conveyed at once to the Egyptian High Command in Cairo. The Egyptians replied that they were expecting such an attack and were prepared for it.
This was the third time that Jordan had warned Egypt that Israel was likely to commence hostilities in this way. The previous occasions had been at the meeting with Nasser on 30 May and 3 June when King Hussein had told Nasser that all the information coming into Jordan pointed to a surprise attack by Israel on Egyptian airfields on 5 or 6 June.
At 7 a.m. the next day the Jordanian radar station at Ajloun showed intense aerial activity over Israel. This information was conveyed to Riad who immediately passed it on to the Egyptian High Command. However, the Egyptian High Command did not receive this message and consequently no alert was issued to its air force.
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- Information
- Jordan in the 1967 War , pp. 122 - 140Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1987