Skip to main content Accessibility help

We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.

Close cookie message
×
Hostname: page-component-669899f699-rg895 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2025-05-06T19:50:53.731Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

3 - Institutionalism and International Law

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 January 2013

By
Barbara Koremenos
Edited by
Jeffrey L. Dunoff  and
Mark A. Pollack
Jeffrey L. Dunoff
Affiliation:
Temple University, Philadelphia
Mark A. Pollack
Affiliation:
Temple University, Philadelphia
Get access

Summary

In a major, theoretically oriented political science department in the mid-1990s, a young scholar proposed a dissertation topic that would focus on a detail of international law. In response, a very prominent international relations (IR) professor told the student that such a dissertation would probably yield no interviews, let alone any job offers. Such was the state of the discipline just a mere decade and a half ago – IR scholarship had “evolved” to the point at which international law was foreign! Although this advice went unheeded, it contained a profoundly important kernel of wisdom: if IR scholars were going to take international law (IL) seriously, they needed to be shown that a detail of international law could matter for something really important. Guess what? It turns out the details of international law matter for the things IR scholars care about: when and how international cooperation occurs and is maintained.

Contemporary international cooperation scholars for quite some time ignored international law. The early institutionalist literature, starting with and building on Krasner (1982) and Keohane (1984), still had to fight the uphill battle of whether international institutions matter, given the more fundamental debate over the possibility of cooperation. Prominent realists argued that concerns of states about relative gains and their position in the international system greatly inhibit the prospects for international cooperation (Grieco 1988; Mearsheimer 1994). The institutionalist literature, by contrast, emphasized the possibility to realize absolute gains from cooperation; that is, cooperation could be framed as a positive sum, rather than a zero sum, game. Keohane's After Hegemony (1984), for instance, takes Waltz's realist assumptions as a given and shows that cooperation can be maintained through international institutions even in the absence of a hegemon providing goods. Institutions, from this vantage point, facilitate and stabilize cooperation. In particular, institutions reduce transaction costs and provide an arena for regular communication, thereby fostering interdependencies and opportunities for (informational) exchange. And, by collecting and disseminating information, information asymmetries and uncertainties, often inherently hostile to cooperation, are resolved. These mechanisms help to maintain cooperation even in the adverse circumstances of an anarchic international environment.

Type
Chapter
Information
Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International Relations
The State of the Art
 , pp. 59 - 82
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2012

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Book purchase

Temporarily unavailable

References

Abbott, Kenneth W., and Snidal, Duncan (2000). “Hard and Soft Law in International Governance,” International Organization, Vol. 54, No. 3, pp. 421–56.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Allee, Todd, and Huth, Paul (2006). “The Pursuit of Legal Settlements to Territorial Disputes,” Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol. 23, No. 4, pp. 285–307.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Alter, Karen J. (2010). “Tipping the Balance: International Courts and the Construction of International and Domestic Politics,” Working Paper (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University, The Roberta Buffett Center for International and Comparative Studies).
Alter, Karen J (2013). “The Multiple Roles of International Courts and Tribunals: Enforcement, Dispute Settlement, Constitutional and Administrative Review,” in Jeffrey L. Dunoff and Mark A. Pollack (eds.), Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International Relations: The State of the Art (New York: Cambridge University Press), pp. 345–70.Google Scholar
Alter, Karen J., and Meunier, Sophie (2009). “The Politics of International Regime Complexity,” Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 7, No. 1, pp. 13–24.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Axelrod, Robert (1984). The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books).Google Scholar
Axelrod, Robert, and Keohane, Robert O (1985). “Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions,” World Politics, Vol. 38, No. 1, pp. 226–54.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Baccini, Leonardo (2010). “Explaining Formation and Design of EU Trade Agreements: The Role of Transparency and Flexibility,” European Union Politics, Vol. 11, No. 2, pp. 195–217.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Blum, Gabriella (2008). “Bilateralism, Multilateralism, and the Architecture of International Law, Harvard International Law Journal, Vol. 49, No. 2, pp. 323–78.Google Scholar
Bradley, Curtis A., and Kelley, Judith G. (2008). “The Concept of International Delegation,” Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol. 71, No. 1, pp. 1–36.Google Scholar
Brewster, Rachel (2013). “Reputation in International Relations and International Law Theory,” in Jeffrey L. Dunoff and Mark A. Pollack (eds.), Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International Relations: The State of the Art (New York: Cambridge University Press), pp. 524–43.Google Scholar
Brunnée, Jutta, and Toope, Stephen (2013). “Constructivism and International Law,” in Dunoff, Jeffrey L. and Pollack, Mark A (eds.), Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International Relations: The State of the Art (New York: Cambridge University Press), pp. 119–45.Google Scholar
Busch, Marc L., and Reinhardt, Eric (2003). “Developing Countries and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement,” Journal of World Trade, Vol. 37, No. 4, pp. 719–35.Google Scholar
Busch, Marc L., and Reinhardt, Eric (2007). “Three's a Crowd: Third Parties and WTO Dispute Settlement,” World Politics, Vol. 58, No. 3, pp. 446–77.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Carneiro, Cristiane (2007). “From the United Nations Arms Register to an Arms Trade Treaty – What Role for Delegation and Flexibility,” ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law, Vol. 14, pp. 477–98.Google Scholar
Chayes, Abram, and Chayes, Antonia Handler (1993). “On Compliance,” International Organization, Vol. 47, No. 2, pp. 175–205.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Davis, Christina L., and Bermeo, Sarah Blodgett (2009). “Who Files? Developing Country Participation in GATT/WTO Adjudication,” Journal of Politics, Vol. 71, No. 3, pp. 1033–49.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Downs, George W., Rocke, David M., and Barsoom, Peter N. (1996). “Is the Good News about Compliance Good News about Cooperation?” International Organization, Vol. 50, No. 3, pp. 379–406.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Downs, George W., and Rocke, David M. (1997). Optimal Imperfection? Domestic Uncertainty and Institutions in International Relations, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).Google Scholar
Duffield, John S. (2003). “The Limits of `Rational Design',” International Organization, Vol. 57, No. 2, pp. 411–30.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fearon, James D. (1998). “Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation,” International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 2, pp. 269–305.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Finnemore, Martha, and Sikkink, Kathryn (1998). “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4, pp. 887–917.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fioretos, Orfeo (2012). “Historical Institutionalism in International Relations,” International Organization, Vol. 65, No. 2, pp. 367–99.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ghosh, Arunabha (2010). “Developing Countries in the WTO Trade Policy Review Mechanism,” World Trade Review, Vol. 9, No. 3, pp. 419–55.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Goldstein, Judith O., Kahler, Miles, Keohane, Robert O., and Slaughter, Anne-Marie (2000). “Introduction: Legalization and World Politics,” International Organization, Vol. 54, No. 3, pp. 385–99.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Grieco, Joseph M. (1988). “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism,” International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3, pp. 485–507.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Guzman, Andrew T. (2008). How International Law Works: A Rational Choice Theory. (Oxford: Oxford University Press).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Guzman, Andrew T., and Simmons, Beth A. (2002). “To Settle or Empanel? An Empirical Analysis of Litigation and Settlement at the World Trade Organization,” Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 31, No. 1, pp. S205–S235.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hafner-Burton, Emilie M., and Tsutsui, Kiyoteru (2005). “Human Rights in a Globalizing World: The Paradox of Empty Promises,” American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 110, No. 5, pp. 1373–1411.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Haftel, Yoram Z., and Thompson, Alexander (2006). “The Independence of International Organizations: Concept and Applications,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 50, No. 2, pp. 253–75.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Helfer, Laurence R. (2002). “Overlegalizing Human Rights: International Relations Theory and the Commonwealth Caribbean Backlash against Human Rights Regimes,” Columbia Law Review, Vol. 102, No. 7, pp. 1832–1911.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Helfer, Laurence R (2006). “Not Fully Committed? Reservations, Risk, and Treaty Design,” Yale Journal of International Law, Vol. 31, No. 2, pp. 367–82.Google Scholar
Kay, Adrian, and Ackrill, Robert (2009). “Institutional Change in the International Governance of Agriculture: A Revised Account,” Governance, Vol. 22, No. 3, pp. 483–506.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Keohane, Robert O. (1984). After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).Google Scholar
Kleine, Mareike (2010). “Making Cooperation Work: Informal Governance in the EU and Beyond,” Paper Presented at the 2010 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association.
Koh, Harold (1996). “Transnational Legal Process,” Nebraska Law Review, Vol. 75, pp. 181–207.Google Scholar
Koh, Harold (1998). “How Is International Human Rights Law Enforced?” Indiana Law Review, Vol. 74, pp. 1397–1417.
Koremenos, Barbara (2001). “Loosening the Ties That Bind: A Learning Model of Agreement Flexibility,” International Organization Vol. 55, No. 2, pp. 289–325.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Koremenos, Barbara (2002). “Can Cooperation Survive Changes in Bargaining Power? The Case of Coffee,” Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 31, No. 1, pp. S259–S283.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Koremenos, Barbara (2005). “Contracting around International Uncertainty,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 99, No. 4, pp. 549–65.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Koremenos, Barbara (2007). “If Only Half of International Agreements Have Dispute Resolution Provisions, Which Half Needs Explaining?,”Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 36, No. 1, pp. 189–212.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Koremenos, Barbara (2011). “An Economic Analysis of International Rulemaking,” Working Paper (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan, Department of Political Science).
Koremenos, Barbara (2012). “What's Left Out and Why? Informal Provisions in Formal International Law.” Manuscript, Presented at the Political Economy of International Organizations Conference, January 2012.
Koremenos, Barbara (forthcoming). “The Continent of International Law,” Journal of Conflict Resolution.
Koremenos, Barbara, Lipson, Charles, and Snidal, Duncan (2001). “The Rational Design of International Institutions,” International Organization, Vol. 55, No. 4, pp. 761–99.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Koremenos, Barbara, and Nau, Allison (2010). “Exit, No Exit,” Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law, Vol. 21, No. 1, pp. 81–119.Google Scholar
Koremenos, Barbara, and Hong, Mihwa (2011). “The Rational Design of Human Rights Agreements,” Working Paper (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, Department of Political Science).
Koremenos, Barbara, and Betz, Timm (2013). “The Design of Dispute Settlement Procedures in International Agreements,” in Jeffrey L. Dunoff and Mark A. Pollack (eds.), Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International Relations: The State of the Art (New York: Cambridge University Press), pp. 371–93.Google Scholar
Koremenos, Barbara, and Snidal, Duncan (2012). “Fixing What's Fixed: A Preliminary Agenda for Thinking about International Change.” Manuscript.
Krasner, Stephen D. (1982). “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables,” International Organization, Vol. 36, No. 2, pp. 185–205.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Krasner, Stephen D (1991). “Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier,” World Politics, Vol. 43, No. 3, pp. 336–66.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Leeds, Brett, Ritter, Jeffrey, Mitchell, Sara McLaughlin, and Long, Andrew (2002). “Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions, 1815–1944,” International Interactions, Vol. 28, No. 3, pp. 237–60.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Levit, Janet (2004). “The Dynamics of International Trade Finance Regulation: The Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits,” Harvard International Law Journal, Vol. 45, No. 1, pp. 65–182.Google Scholar
Lipson, Charles (1991). “Why Are Some International Agreements Informal?” International Organization, Vol. 45, No. 4, pp. 495–538.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McLaughlin Mitchell, Sara, and Hensel, Paul R (2007). “International Institutions and Compliance with Agreements,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 51, No. 4, pp. 721–37.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mearsheimer, John J. (1994). “The False Promise of International Institutions,” International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3, pp. 5–49.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mitchell, Ronald B. (2002–12). International Environmental Agreements Database Project (Version 2010.3), available at: .
Moravcsik, , , Andrew (2000). “The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe,” International Organization, Vol. 54, No. 2, pp. 217–52.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Moravcsik, , , Andrew (2008). “The New Liberalism,” in Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of International Relations(Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 234–54.Google Scholar
Moravcsik, , , Andrew (2010). “Liberal Theories of International Relations: A Primer,” Manuscript (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).
Morrow, James D. (2007). “When Do States Follow the Laws of War?” American Political Science Review, Vol. 101, No. 3, pp. 559–72.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Odell, John (2010). “Three Islands of Knowledge about Negotiation in International Organizations,” Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 17, No. 5, pp. 619–32.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Oye, Kenneth A. (1986). “Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies,” in Kenneth A. Oye (ed.), Cooperation under Anarchy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press), pp. 1–24.Google Scholar
Pauwelyn, Joost, and Elsig, Manfred (2013). “The Politics of Treaty Interpretation: Variations and Explanations Across International Tribunals,” in Dunoff, Jeffrey L. and Pollack, Mark A. (eds.), Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International Relations: The State of the Art (New York: Cambridge University Press), pp. 445–73.Google Scholar
Putnam, Robert D. (1988). “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3, pp. 427–60.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Raustiala, Kal (2005). “Form and Substance in International Agreements,” American Journal of International Law, Vol. 99, No. 3, pp. 581–614.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Raustiala, Kal (2013). “Density and Fragmentation in International Institutions,” in Dunoff, Jeffrey L. and Pollack, Mark A. (eds.), Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International Relations: The State of the Art (New York: Cambridge University Press), pp. 293–320.Google Scholar
Raustiala, Kal, and Victor, David G (2004). “The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic Resources,” International Organization, Vol. 58, No. 2, pp. 277–309.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Reh, Christine, Héritier, Adrienne, Bressanelli, Edoardo, and Koop, Christel (2010). “The Informal Politics of Legislation: Explaining secluded Decision-Making in the European Union,” Paper Prepared for the 2010 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association.
Risse, Thomas, and Kleine, Mareike (2010). “Deliberation in Negotiations,” Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 17, No. 5, pp. 708–26.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rixen, Thomas (2010). “Bilateralism or Multilateralism? The Political Economy of Avoiding International Double Taxation,” European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 16, No. 4, pp. 589–614.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rosendorff, B. Peter (2005). “Stability and Rigidity: Politics and Design of the WTO's Dispute Settlement Procedure,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 99, No. 3, pp. 389–400.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rosendorff, B. Peter, and Milner, Helen V. (2001). “The Optimal Design of International Trade Institutions: Uncertainty and Escape,”International Organization, Vol. 55, No. 4, pp. 829–57.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sattler, Thomas, and Bernauer, Thomas (2010). “Gravitation or Discrimination? Determinants of Litigation in the World Trade Organisation,” European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 50, No. 2, pp. 143–67.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Shaffer, Gregory C., and Pollack, Mark A. (2013). “Hard Law and Soft Law,” in Dunoff, Jeffrey L. and Pollack, Mark A. (eds.), Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International Relations: The State of the Art (New York: Cambridge University Press), pp. 197–222.Google Scholar
Simmons, Beth A. (2000). “International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 94, No. 4, pp. 819–35.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Simmons, Beth A (2002). “Capacity, Commitment, and Compliance: International Institutions and Territorial Disputes,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 46, No. 6, pp. 829–56.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Simmons, Beth A (2009). Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law and Domestic Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Simmons, Beth A (2010). “Treaty Compliance and Violation,” Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 13, No. 1, pp. 273–96.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Simmons, Beth A., and Hopkins, Daniel J (2005). “The Constraining Power of International Treaties: Theory and Methods,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 99, No. 4, pp. 623–31.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Smith, James (2004). “Inequality in International Trade? Developing Countries and Institutional Change in WTO Dispute Settlement,” Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 11, No. 3, pp. 542–73.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Stone, Randall W. (2010). “Controlling Institutions: International Organizations and the Political Economy,” Paper Presented at the 2010 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association.
Swaine, Edward T. (2006). “Reserving,” Yale Journal of International Law, Vol. 31, No. 2, pp. 307–66.Google Scholar
Thompson, Alexander (2009). “The Rational Enforcement of International Law: Solving the Sanctioners’ Dilemma,” International Theory, Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 307–21.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Thompson, Alexander (2010). “Rational Design in Motion: Uncertainty and Flexibility in the Global Climate Regime,” European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 16, No. 2, pp. 269–96.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Thompson, Alexander (2013). “Coercive Enforcement in International Law,” in Dunoff, Jeffrey L. and Pollack, Mark A. (eds.), Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International Relations: The State of the Art (New York: Cambridge University Press), pp. 502–23.Google Scholar
Trachtman, Joel P. (2013). “Open Economy Law,” in Dunoff, Jeffrey L and Pollack, Mark A. (eds.), Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International Relations: The State of the Art (New York: Cambridge University Press), pp. 544–67.Google Scholar
Verdier, Daniel (2008). “Multilateralism, Bilateralism, and Exclusion in the Nuclear Proliferation Regime,” International Organization, Vol. 62, No. 3, pp. 439–76.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
von Stein, Jana (2005). “Do Treaties Constrain or Screen? Selection Bias and Treaty Compliance,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 99, No. 4, pp. 611–22.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
von Stein, Jana (2013). “The Engines of Compliance,” in Dunoff, Jeffrey L. and Pollack, Mark A. (eds.), Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International Relations: The State of the Art (New York: Cambridge University Press), pp. 477–501.Google Scholar

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected] is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×