Skip to main content Accessibility help

We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.

Close cookie message
×
Hostname: page-component-669899f699-ggqkh Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2025-05-04T14:29:30.778Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

15 - The Design of Dispute Settlement Procedures in International Agreements

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 January 2013

By
Barbara Koremenos  and
Timm Betz
Edited by
Jeffrey L. Dunoff  and
Mark A. Pollack
Jeffrey L. Dunoff
Affiliation:
Temple University, Philadelphia
Mark A. Pollack
Affiliation:
Temple University, Philadelphia
Get access

Summary

What explains the inclusion of formal dispute settlement procedures in international agreements? Delegating any kind of decision-making comes at a significant sovereignty cost, as Abbott and Snidal (2000: 436) note. From this perspective, instances of delegation are puzzling. Some legal scholars, however, argue that international law becomes more effective the more “lawlike” it is. Helfer and Slaughter (1997: 283), for instance, regard international tribunals as an integral part of “a global community of law.” From this perspective, the absence of dispute resolution mechanisms in some agreements is what begs an explanation.

Based on game theory insights, Koremenos (2007) argues that the inclusion of dispute settlement procedures in international agreements is a deliberate choice by governments, made to address specific cooperation problems. The implication is that international law is designed efficiently: dispute settlement procedures are likely to be incorporated into agreements if, but only if, they are needed to solve specific problems. Her data confirm this viewpoint.

Type
Chapter
Information
Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International Relations
The State of the Art
 , pp. 371 - 393
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2012

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Book purchase

Temporarily unavailable

References

Abbott, Kenneth W., and Snidal, Duncan (2000). “Hard and Soft Law in International Governance,” International Organization, Vol. 54, No. 3, pp. 421–56.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Alter, Karen J. (2003). “Resolving or Exacerbating Disputes? The WTO's New Dispute Resolution System,” International Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 4, pp. 783–800.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Alter, Karen J. (2013). “The Multiple Roles of International Courts and Tribunals: Enforcement, Dispute Settlement, Constitutional and Administrative Review,” in Dunoff, Jeffrey L. and Pollack, Mark A. (eds.), Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International Relations: The State of the Art (New York: Cambridge University Press), pp. 345–70.Google Scholar
Barceló, John J. III (2009). “Burden of Proof, Prima Facie Case and Presumption in WTO Dispute Settlement,” Cornell International Law Journal, Vol. 42, No. 23, pp. 23–43.Google Scholar
Beck, Katherine (2011). “The Evolution of Dispute Resolution in the American Convention on Human Rights,” Working Paper (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, Department of Political Science).
Betz, Timm (2010). “Endogenous Variables in Probit Models: Comparing Estimators,” Working Paper (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, Department of Political Science).
Betz, Timm (2011). “Crime without Punishment: Delegation, Flexibility, and Exploitation in International Agreements,” Working Paper (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, Department of Political Science).
Brewster, Rachel (2006). “Rule-Based Dispute Resolution in International Trade Law,” Virginia Law Review, Vol. 92, No. 2, pp. 251–88.Google Scholar
Brunnée, Jutta, and Toope, Stephen J. (2011). “Interactional International Law: An Introduction,” International Theory, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 307–18.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Brutger, Ryan (2011). “Private Parties: Hidden Actors of WTO Dispute Settlement,” Working Paper (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, Department of Political Science).
Busch, Marc L., and Reinhardt, Eric (2003). “Developing Countries and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement,” Journal of World Trade, Vol. 37, No. 4, pp. 719–35.Google Scholar
Charnovitz, Steve (2009). “The Enforcement of WTO Judgements,” Yale Journal of International Law, Vol. 34, No. 2, pp. 558–66.Google Scholar
Chayes, Abram, and Chayes, Antonia Handler (1993). “On Compliance,” International Organization, Vol. 47, No. 2, pp. 175–205.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Davis, Christina L., and Bermeo, Sarah Blodgett (2009). “Who Files? Developing Country Participation in GATT/WTO Adjudication,” Journal of Politics, Vol. 71, No. 3, pp. 1033–49.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Downs, George. W., Rocke, David M., and Barsoom, Peter N. (1996). “Is the Good News about Compliance Good News about Cooperation?” International Organization, Vol. 50, No. 3, pp. 379–406.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ginsburg, Tom, and McAdams, Richard H. (2003). “Adjudicating in Anarchy: An Expressive Theory of International Dispute Resolution,” Willam & Mary Law Review, Vol. 45, No. 4, pp. 1229–1339.Google Scholar
Goldstein, Judith O., Kahler, Miles, Keohane, Robert O., and Slaughter, Anne-Marie (2000). “Introduction: Legalization and World Politics,” International Organization, Vol. 54, No. 3, pp. 385–99.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Grando, Michelle T. (2006). “Allocating the Burden of Proof in WTO Disputes. A Critical Analysis,” Journal of International Economic Law, Vol. 9, No. 3, pp. 615–56.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Guzman, Andrew T., and Meyer, Timothy L. (2010). “International Soft Law,” Journal of Legal Analysis, Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 171–225.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Helfer, Laurence R. (2013). “Flexibility in International Agreements,” in Dunoff, Jeffrey L. and Pollack, Mark A. (eds.), Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International Relations: The State of the Art (New York: Cambridge University Press), pp. 175–96.Google Scholar
Helfer, Laurence R., and Slaughter, Anne-Marie (1997). “Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication,” Yale Law Journal, Vol. 107, No. 2, pp. 273–391.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Henkin, Louis (1995). “U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of Senator Bricker,” American Journal of International Law, Vol. 89, No. 2, pp. 341–50.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Huth, Paul K., Croco, Sarah E., and Appel, Benjamin J. (2011). “Does International Law Promote the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes? Evidence from the Study of Territorial Conflicts since 1945,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 105, No. 2, pp. 1–22.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Keohane, Robert O. (1984). After Hegemony. Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).Google Scholar
Keohane, Robert O., Moravcsik, Andrew, and Slaughter, Anne-Marie (2000). “Legalized Dispute Resolution: Interstate and Transnational,” International Organization, Vol. 54, No. 3, pp. 457–88.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kim, Moonhawk (2008). “Costly Procedures: Divergent Effects of Legalization in the GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 52, No. 3, pp. 657–86.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Koh, Harold Hongju (1997). “Why Do Nations Obey International Law?” Yale Law Journal, Vol. 106, No. 8, pp. 2599–659.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Koremenos, Barbara (2005). “Contracting around International Uncertainty,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 99, No. 4, pp. 549–65.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Koremenos, Barbara (2007). “If Only Half of International Agreements Have Dispute Resolution Provisions, Which Half Needs Explaining?,” Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 36, No. 1, pp. 189–212.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Koremenos, Barbara (2011). “An Economic Analysis of International Rulemaking,” Working Paper (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, Department of Political Science).
Koremenos, Barbara (forthcoming). “The Continent of International Law,” Journal of Conflict Resolution.
Koremenos, Barbara (book manuscript). “The Continent of International Law” (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, Department of Political Science).
Koremenos, Barbara, Lipson, Charles, and Snidal, Duncan (2001). “The Rational Design of International Institutions,” International Organization, Vol. 55, No. 4, pp. 761–99.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Krasner, Stephen D. (1978). Defending the National Interest (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).Google Scholar
Kucik, Jeffrey, and Reinhardt, Eric (2008). “Does Flexibility Promote Cooperation? An Application to the Global Trade Regime,” International Organization, Vol. 62, No. 3, pp. 477–505.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Leeds, Brett, Ritter, Jeffrey, Mitchell, Sara McLaughlin, and Long, Andrew (2002). “Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions,” International Interactions, Vol. 28, No. 3, pp. 237–60.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mearsheimer, John J. (1994). “The False Promise of International Institutions,” International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3, pp. 5–49.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mitchell, Ronald B. (2002–11). International Environmental Agreements Database Project (Version 2010.3), available at .
Muthoo, Abhinay (2002). Bargaining Theory with Applications (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).Google Scholar
Posner, Eric A., and Yoo, John C. (2005). “Judicial Independence in International Tribunals,” California Law Review, Vol. 93, No. 1, pp. 1–74.Google Scholar
Rosendorff, B. Peter (2005). “Stability and Rigidity: Politics and Design of the WTO's Dispute Settlement Procedure,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 99, No. 3, pp. 389–400.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sattler, Thomas, and Bernauer, Thomas (2010). “Gravitation or Discrimination? Determinants of Litigation in the World Trade Organisation,” European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 50, No. 2, pp. 143–67.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Shaffer, Gregory C., and Pollack, Mark A. (2010). “Hard vs. Soft Law: Alternatives, Complements and Antagonists in International Governance,” Minnesota Law Review, Vol. 94, No. 3, pp. 706–99.Google Scholar
Simmons, Beth A. (2000). “International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 94, No. 4, pp. 819–35.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Simmons, Beth A. (2009). Mobilizing for Human Rights. International Law and Domestic Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Smith, Alastair (1999). “Testing Theories of Strategic Choice: The Example of Crisis Escalation,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 43, No. 4, pp. 1254–83.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Smith, James McCall (2000). “The Politics of Dispute Settlement Design: Explaining Legalism in Regional Trade Pacts,” International Organization, Vol. 54, No. 1, pp. 137–80.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Thompson, Alexander (2009). “The Rational Enforcement of International Law: Solving the Sanctioners’ Dilemma,” International Theory, Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 307–21.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
von Stein, Jana (2005). “Do Treaties Constrain or Screen? Selection Bias and Treaty Compliance,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 99, No. 4, pp. 611–22.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected] is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×