Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International Relations The State of the Art
Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Contributors
- Acknowledgments
- Part I Introduction: Setting the Stage
- Part II Theorizing International Law
- Part III Making International Law
- Part IV The Interpretation and Application of International Law
- 14 The Multiple Roles of International Courts and Tribunals
- 15 The Design of Dispute Settlement Procedures in International Agreements
- 16 Whose Agents? The Interpretation of International Law in National Courts
- 17 International Judicial Independence
- 18 The Politics of Treaty Interpretation
- Part V Enforcement, Compliance, and Effectiveness
- Conclusions
- Index
- References
15 - The Design of Dispute Settlement Procedures in International Agreements
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 January 2013
Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Contributors
- Acknowledgments
- Part I Introduction: Setting the Stage
- Part II Theorizing International Law
- Part III Making International Law
- Part IV The Interpretation and Application of International Law
- 14 The Multiple Roles of International Courts and Tribunals
- 15 The Design of Dispute Settlement Procedures in International Agreements
- 16 Whose Agents? The Interpretation of International Law in National Courts
- 17 International Judicial Independence
- 18 The Politics of Treaty Interpretation
- Part V Enforcement, Compliance, and Effectiveness
- Conclusions
- Index
- References
Summary
What explains the inclusion of formal dispute settlement procedures in international agreements? Delegating any kind of decision-making comes at a significant sovereignty cost, as Abbott and Snidal (2000: 436) note. From this perspective, instances of delegation are puzzling. Some legal scholars, however, argue that international law becomes more effective the more “lawlike” it is. Helfer and Slaughter (1997: 283), for instance, regard international tribunals as an integral part of “a global community of law.” From this perspective, the absence of dispute resolution mechanisms in some agreements is what begs an explanation.
Based on game theory insights, Koremenos (2007) argues that the inclusion of dispute settlement procedures in international agreements is a deliberate choice by governments, made to address specific cooperation problems. The implication is that international law is designed efficiently: dispute settlement procedures are likely to be incorporated into agreements if, but only if, they are needed to solve specific problems. Her data confirm this viewpoint.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International RelationsThe State of the Art, pp. 371 - 393Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2012
References
, and (2000). “Hard and Soft Law in International Governance,” International Organization, Vol. 54, No. 3, pp. 421–56.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(2003). “Resolving or Exacerbating Disputes? The WTO's New Dispute Resolution System,” International Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 4, pp. 783–800.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(2013). “The Multiple Roles of International Courts and Tribunals: Enforcement, Dispute Settlement, Constitutional and Administrative Review,” in and (eds.), Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International Relations: The State of the Art (New York: Cambridge University Press), pp. 345–70.Google Scholar
III (2009). “Burden of Proof, Prima Facie Case and Presumption in WTO Dispute Settlement,” Cornell International Law Journal, Vol. 42, No. 23, pp. 23–43.Google Scholar
(2011). “The Evolution of Dispute Resolution in the American Convention on Human Rights,” Working Paper (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, Department of Political Science).
(2010). “Endogenous Variables in Probit Models: Comparing Estimators,” Working Paper (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, Department of Political Science).
(2011). “Crime without Punishment: Delegation, Flexibility, and Exploitation in International Agreements,” Working Paper (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, Department of Political Science).
(2006). “Rule-Based Dispute Resolution in International Trade Law,” Virginia Law Review, Vol. 92, No. 2, pp. 251–88.Google Scholar
, and (2011). “Interactional International Law: An Introduction,” International Theory, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 307–18.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(2011). “Private Parties: Hidden Actors of WTO Dispute Settlement,” Working Paper (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, Department of Political Science).
, and (2003). “Developing Countries and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement,” Journal of World Trade, Vol. 37, No. 4, pp. 719–35.Google Scholar
(2009). “The Enforcement of WTO Judgements,” Yale Journal of International Law, Vol. 34, No. 2, pp. 558–66.Google Scholar
, and (1993). “On Compliance,” International Organization, Vol. 47, No. 2, pp. 175–205.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, and (2009). “Who Files? Developing Country Participation in GATT/WTO Adjudication,” Journal of Politics, Vol. 71, No. 3, pp. 1033–49.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, , and (1996). “Is the Good News about Compliance Good News about Cooperation?” International Organization, Vol. 50, No. 3, pp. 379–406.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, and (2003). “Adjudicating in Anarchy: An Expressive Theory of International Dispute Resolution,” Willam & Mary Law Review, Vol. 45, No. 4, pp. 1229–1339.Google Scholar
, , , and (2000). “Introduction: Legalization and World Politics,” International Organization, Vol. 54, No. 3, pp. 385–99.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(2006). “Allocating the Burden of Proof in WTO Disputes. A Critical Analysis,” Journal of International Economic Law, Vol. 9, No. 3, pp. 615–56.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, and (2010). “International Soft Law,” Journal of Legal Analysis, Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 171–225.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(2013). “Flexibility in International Agreements,” in and (eds.), Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International Relations: The State of the Art (New York: Cambridge University Press), pp. 175–96.Google Scholar
, and (1997). “Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication,” Yale Law Journal, Vol. 107, No. 2, pp. 273–391.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(1995). “U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of Senator Bricker,” American Journal of International Law, Vol. 89, No. 2, pp. 341–50.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, , and (2011). “Does International Law Promote the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes? Evidence from the Study of Territorial Conflicts since 1945,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 105, No. 2, pp. 1–22.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(1984). After Hegemony. Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).Google Scholar
, , and (2000). “Legalized Dispute Resolution: Interstate and Transnational,” International Organization, Vol. 54, No. 3, pp. 457–88.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(2008). “Costly Procedures: Divergent Effects of Legalization in the GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 52, No. 3, pp. 657–86.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(1997). “Why Do Nations Obey International Law?” Yale Law Journal, Vol. 106, No. 8, pp. 2599–659.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(2005). “Contracting around International Uncertainty,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 99, No. 4, pp. 549–65.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(2007). “If Only Half of International Agreements Have Dispute Resolution Provisions, Which Half Needs Explaining?,” Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 36, No. 1, pp. 189–212.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(2011). “An Economic Analysis of International Rulemaking,” Working Paper (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, Department of Political Science).
(forthcoming). “The Continent of International Law,” Journal of Conflict Resolution.
(book manuscript). “The Continent of International Law” (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, Department of Political Science).
, , and (2001). “The Rational Design of International Institutions,” International Organization, Vol. 55, No. 4, pp. 761–99.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, and (2008). “Does Flexibility Promote Cooperation? An Application to the Global Trade Regime,” International Organization, Vol. 62, No. 3, pp. 477–505.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, , , and (2002). “Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions,” International Interactions, Vol. 28, No. 3, pp. 237–60.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(1994). “The False Promise of International Institutions,” International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3, pp. 5–49.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(2002–11). International Environmental Agreements Database Project (Version 2010.3), available at .
, and (2005). “Judicial Independence in International Tribunals,” California Law Review, Vol. 93, No. 1, pp. 1–74.Google Scholar
(2005). “Stability and Rigidity: Politics and Design of the WTO's Dispute Settlement Procedure,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 99, No. 3, pp. 389–400.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, and (2010). “Gravitation or Discrimination? Determinants of Litigation in the World Trade Organisation,” European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 50, No. 2, pp. 143–67.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, and (2010). “Hard vs. Soft Law: Alternatives, Complements and Antagonists in International Governance,” Minnesota Law Review, Vol. 94, No. 3, pp. 706–99.Google Scholar
(2000). “International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 94, No. 4, pp. 819–35.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(2009). Mobilizing for Human Rights. International Law and Domestic Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(1999). “Testing Theories of Strategic Choice: The Example of Crisis Escalation,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 43, No. 4, pp. 1254–83.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(2000). “The Politics of Dispute Settlement Design: Explaining Legalism in Regional Trade Pacts,” International Organization, Vol. 54, No. 1, pp. 137–80.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(2009). “The Rational Enforcement of International Law: Solving the Sanctioners’ Dilemma,” International Theory, Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 307–21.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(2005). “Do Treaties Constrain or Screen? Selection Bias and Treaty Compliance,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 99, No. 4, pp. 611–22.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
- 6
- Cited by