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11 - Philosophy for an Ending World

from Part III - Humanity Facing the Near Environmental Future

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2024

By
Tim Mulgan
Edited by
Hiroshi Abe ,
Matthias Fritsch  and
Mario Wenning
Hiroshi Abe
Affiliation:
Kyoto University
Matthias Fritsch
Affiliation:
Concordia University, Montréal
Mario Wenning
Affiliation:
Loyola University, Spain
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Summary

This chapter explores the philosophical implications of a slowly ending world -- a place where humanity faces unavoidable and imminent (but not immediate) extinction. Section 1 introduces this new thought experiment. Section 2 asks why we should think about unavoidable, imminent, non-immediate human extinction. I argue that my slowly ending world is both an interesting thought experiment and a credible possible future. Sections 3 to 5 explore three topics in detail from the perspective of this slowly ending world: philosophical pessimism, procreative ethics, and multigenerational optimism. The goal of the chapter is not to defend any particular conclusions about the philosophy of the ending world, but simply to motivate its exploration.

Keywords

consequentialismhuman extinctionprocreative ethicsbroken worldending worldpessimismScheffleranti-natalism
Type
Chapter
Information
Intercultural Philosophy and Environmental Justice between Generations
Indigenous, African, Asian, and Western Perspectives
 , pp. 204 - 222
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2024

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