Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgements
- Introduction: Why a New Account of Intentionality?
- 1 Intentionality and the Problem of Transcendental Friction
- 2 The Epistemic Given and the Semantic Given in C. I. Lewis
- 3 Discursive Intentionality and ‘Nonconceptual Content’ in Sellars
- 4 The Retreat from Nonconceptualism: Discourse and Experience in Brandom and McDowell
- 5 Somatic Intentionality and Habitual Normativity in Merleau-Ponty's Account of Lived Embodiment
- 6 The Possibilities and Problems of Bifurcated Intentionality
- Conclusion
- Appendix: Is Phenomenology Committed to the Myth of the Given?
- Works Cited
- Notes
- Index
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Contents
Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgements
- Introduction: Why a New Account of Intentionality?
- 1 Intentionality and the Problem of Transcendental Friction
- 2 The Epistemic Given and the Semantic Given in C. I. Lewis
- 3 Discursive Intentionality and ‘Nonconceptual Content’ in Sellars
- 4 The Retreat from Nonconceptualism: Discourse and Experience in Brandom and McDowell
- 5 Somatic Intentionality and Habitual Normativity in Merleau-Ponty's Account of Lived Embodiment
- 6 The Possibilities and Problems of Bifurcated Intentionality
- Conclusion
- Appendix: Is Phenomenology Committed to the Myth of the Given?
- Works Cited
- Notes
- Index
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- Intentionality and Myths of the GivenBetween Pragmatism and Phenomenology, pp. v - viPublisher: Pickering & ChattoFirst published in: 2014