Book contents
- Intention and Wrongdoing
- Intention and Wrongdoing
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Preface
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- Chapter 1 The Principle of Double Effect
- Chapter 2 The Grounding Challenge
- Chapter 3 Double Effect and the Morality of Solidarity
- Chapter 4 An Anscombian Account of Intentional Action
- Chapter 5 The Closeness Problem
- Chapter 6 The Irrelevance Theory and More Objections
- Chapter 7 Has Cognitive Science Debunked Deontology?
- Conclusion
- References
- Index
Chapter 7 - Has Cognitive Science Debunked Deontology?
Double Effect and Greene’s Debunking Argument
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 December 2021
- Intention and Wrongdoing
- Intention and Wrongdoing
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Preface
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- Chapter 1 The Principle of Double Effect
- Chapter 2 The Grounding Challenge
- Chapter 3 Double Effect and the Morality of Solidarity
- Chapter 4 An Anscombian Account of Intentional Action
- Chapter 5 The Closeness Problem
- Chapter 6 The Irrelevance Theory and More Objections
- Chapter 7 Has Cognitive Science Debunked Deontology?
- Conclusion
- References
- Index
Summary
In Chapter 7, I argue that the solidarity rationale for the PDE from Chapter 3 enables a response to Joshua Greene’s argument that findings from empirical psychology debunk deontological constraints on causing harm. Greene’s deontological debunking argument is based on the dual-process theory of moral judgment, and I begin by reviewing the main elements of this theory. Next, I describe the two stages of Greene’s debunking argument. Stage 1 aims to debunk the case-based intuitions that seem to support deontology over consequentialism, while Stage 2 aims to debunk deontological normative ethics. I argue that Stage 2 of Greene’s argument is unsatisfactory, and I explain why it fails to undermine the solidarity rationale for the PDE. Finally, I outline two possible explanations of why our case-based intuitions should be sensitive (even if imperfectly) to a feature of conduct – intentional harm – that is morally significant.
Keywords
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Intention and WrongdoingIn Defense of Double Effect, pp. 162 - 179Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2021