Academic attention on democratic consolidation is riveted to the making of formal rules, notably the choice of electoral system and the rewriting of the constitution. Formal rules are important for an understanding of the political process. They lay down the basic institutional framework within which political elites compete. They embody an incentive system that shapes the behavior of political elites.

However, politics should be understood in terms of unwritten rules as well. First, formal rules may become completely ritualized, as in pre-1989 European communist regimes. Often, formal rules simply exist on paper, either unenforced or overlooked. For example, political contributions and electoral spending grossly exceed the legal limits in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. Second, while formal and informal power may eventually converge, this process may be very long. Third, the discrepancy between formal rules and the actual code of conduct can be very significant. Fukui and Fukai show that informal politics in Japan is normal politics, while the making and remaking of formal rules are extraordinary politics that explains what went wrong with informal politics but do not explain what usually occurs in Japan. Hence, once the infrequent drama of remaking formal rules is over, unwritten rules reemerge to guide politics.

In informal politics, factionalism stands out as a particularly salient phenomenon. This is particularly true in some parts of the world, such as East Asia, the Mediterranean countries, developing countries in general, and, arguably, the pre–civil rights American South and big immigrant cities.