One of the objectives of Suharto’s foreign policy was to make Indonesia the leader of the Southeast Asian region and beyond. Although Indonesia’s leadership position was more in form than in substance, there was no doubt that Suharto’s Indonesia had played a leading role, at least in Southeast Asia, if not in Asia-Africa.

However, with the 1997 Asian economic crisis and the fall of Suharto in May 1998, Indonesia’s leadership position in Southeast Asia has also declined. In addition, the President is no longer the sole foreign policy maker. The role of parliament becomes important. This postscript examines Indonesia’s foreign policy from the final years of the Suharto period until the early years of Joko “Jokowi” Widodo’s second-term presidency. The discussion in this postscript will follow the general structure of the book, i.e., it begins with Indonesia and ASEAN, followed by Jakarta’s relations with the six other ASEAN states, especially with Malaysia and Singapore. Its relations with other medium powers and superpowers such as Australia, Japan, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the United States are also examined. The last section deals with the Middle East, in which Islam in Indonesia’s foreign policy is addressed. This order is mainly followed in accordance with the geographical proximity to Indonesia, which simultaneously reflects Indonesian geopolitical concerns.

Foreign Policy Decision-Making in Post-Suharto Indonesia

Let us look briefly at foreign policy decision-makers in Indonesia. During the New Order period (March 1966 to May 1998), foreign policy was initially in the hands of the military and President Suharto, and over time came to be concentrated in the hands of the president. The parliament was more a rubber stamp than the real decision-maker. Suharto often used his presidential power to decide on foreign policy issues, and his appointed ambassadors did not have to be endorsed by the parliament. However, during the post-Suharto period, especially after the fall of President Habibie, the presidential power was curtailed and ambassadors have to be endorsed by the parliament. This implies that the parliament began to play a role in foreign policy-making. The parliament could also refuse to rectify a treaty signed with a foreign country by the president. This context should be borne in mind when discussing post-Suharto Indonesia’s foreign policy.