Book contents
- Improving Homeland Security Decisions
- Improving Homeland Security Decisions
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Contributors
- 1 Improving Homeland Security Decisions
- 2 Probabilistic Risk Analysis and Terrorism Risk
- 3 Integrating Stakeholder Values into Strategic Planning through Comparative Risk Analysis
- 4 Validating Terrorism Risk Assessment Models – Lessons Learned from 11 Models
- 5 Coping with Uncertainty in Adversarial Risk Analysis
- 6 A Risk and Economic Analysis of Dirty Bomb Attacks on the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach
- 7 Regional Transportation and Supply Chain Modeling for Large-Scale Emergencies
- 8 Economic Consequences of Terrorism and Natural Disasters: The Computable General Equilibrium Approach
- 9 Economic Resilience to Terrorism and Natural Hazards
- 10 The Temporal Regional Economic Impacts of a Hurricane Disaster on Oil Refinery Operations: A FlexNIEMO Approach
- 11 Risk-Informed Benefit-Cost Analysis
- 12 Enhancing Post-disaster Economic Resilience: Public-Private Partnership for Insuring Terrorism
- 13 Economic Impacts of Changes in Wait Times at U.S. Ports of Entry
- 14 Organizational Decision Processes
- 15 A Value Model for Evaluating Homeland Security Decisions
- 16 Identifying, Structuring, and Comparing the Objectives of Al Qaeda and ISIL
- 17 Multi-objective Decision Making: Expected Utility vs. Some Widely Used (and Flawed) Methods
- 18 Achieving Multiple Objectives with Limited Resources: Using Utility Theory and Control Theory
- 19 Defender-Attacker Decision Tree Analysis to Combat Terrorism
- 20 Decision Making for Bioterror Preparedness: Examples from Smallpox Vaccination Policy
- 21 Stackelberg Security Games (SSG) Basics and Application Overview
- 22 Basic Solution Concepts and Algorithms for Stackelberg Security Games
- 23 Mixed-Integer Optimization Methods for Solving Stackelberg Security Games
- 24 Methods for Addressing the Unpredictable Real-World Element in Security
- 25 Learning to Play Stackelberg Security Games
- 26 Evaluating Deployed Decision Support Systems for Security: Challenges, Analysis, and Approaches
- 27 Homeland Security Resource Allocation Games: Considering Partially Strategic Attackers and Equity
- 28 Decision Analysis by Proxy for Adaptive Adversaries
- 29 Asymmetric Prescriptive/Descriptive Game Theory for Counterterrorism
- 30 Near-Misses and Decision Making Under Uncertainty in the Context of Cybersecurity
- Index
- References
16 - Identifying, Structuring, and Comparing the Objectives of Al Qaeda and ISIL
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 13 December 2017
Book contents
- Improving Homeland Security Decisions
- Improving Homeland Security Decisions
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Contributors
- 1 Improving Homeland Security Decisions
- 2 Probabilistic Risk Analysis and Terrorism Risk
- 3 Integrating Stakeholder Values into Strategic Planning through Comparative Risk Analysis
- 4 Validating Terrorism Risk Assessment Models – Lessons Learned from 11 Models
- 5 Coping with Uncertainty in Adversarial Risk Analysis
- 6 A Risk and Economic Analysis of Dirty Bomb Attacks on the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach
- 7 Regional Transportation and Supply Chain Modeling for Large-Scale Emergencies
- 8 Economic Consequences of Terrorism and Natural Disasters: The Computable General Equilibrium Approach
- 9 Economic Resilience to Terrorism and Natural Hazards
- 10 The Temporal Regional Economic Impacts of a Hurricane Disaster on Oil Refinery Operations: A FlexNIEMO Approach
- 11 Risk-Informed Benefit-Cost Analysis
- 12 Enhancing Post-disaster Economic Resilience: Public-Private Partnership for Insuring Terrorism
- 13 Economic Impacts of Changes in Wait Times at U.S. Ports of Entry
- 14 Organizational Decision Processes
- 15 A Value Model for Evaluating Homeland Security Decisions
- 16 Identifying, Structuring, and Comparing the Objectives of Al Qaeda and ISIL
- 17 Multi-objective Decision Making: Expected Utility vs. Some Widely Used (and Flawed) Methods
- 18 Achieving Multiple Objectives with Limited Resources: Using Utility Theory and Control Theory
- 19 Defender-Attacker Decision Tree Analysis to Combat Terrorism
- 20 Decision Making for Bioterror Preparedness: Examples from Smallpox Vaccination Policy
- 21 Stackelberg Security Games (SSG) Basics and Application Overview
- 22 Basic Solution Concepts and Algorithms for Stackelberg Security Games
- 23 Mixed-Integer Optimization Methods for Solving Stackelberg Security Games
- 24 Methods for Addressing the Unpredictable Real-World Element in Security
- 25 Learning to Play Stackelberg Security Games
- 26 Evaluating Deployed Decision Support Systems for Security: Challenges, Analysis, and Approaches
- 27 Homeland Security Resource Allocation Games: Considering Partially Strategic Attackers and Equity
- 28 Decision Analysis by Proxy for Adaptive Adversaries
- 29 Asymmetric Prescriptive/Descriptive Game Theory for Counterterrorism
- 30 Near-Misses and Decision Making Under Uncertainty in the Context of Cybersecurity
- Index
- References
Summary
A summary is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Improving Homeland Security Decisions , pp. 376 - 395Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2017
References
Abrahms, M. (2008). What terrorists really want. Terrorist motives and counterterrorism strategy. International Security, 32(4), 78–105.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ackermann, S. (2014). Foreign jihadists flocking to Iraq and Syria on “unprecedented scale” – UN. October 30, 2014, accessed through www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/30/foreign-jihadist-iraq-syria-unprecedented-un-ISIL.Google Scholar
Altman, A. (2014). How many foreign fighters have Joined ISIL? September 16, 2014, accessed through http://op-talk.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/09/16/how-many-foreign-fighters-have-joined-ISIL/.Google Scholar
Cockburn, P. (2014). War with ISIL: Islamic militants have army of 200,000, claims senior Kurdish leader. November 16, 2014, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/war-with-ISIL-islamic-militants-have-army-of-200000-claims-kurdish-leader-9863418.html.Google Scholar
Cooper, D. R., & Schindler, P. S. (2008). Business research methods (10th edn.). Boston: McGraw-Hill.Google Scholar
Corsi, J. R. (1981). Terrorism as a desperate game. Fear, bargaining, and communication in the terrorist event. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 25, 47–85.Google Scholar
Enders, W., & Sandler, T. (1995). Terrorism: Theory and applications. In Hartley, K. & Sandler, T. (Eds.), Handbook of defense economics (pp. 129–148). Amsterdam: Elsevier.Google Scholar
Hacker, F. J. (1976). Crusaders, criminals, crazies: Terror and terrorism in our time. New York: Norton.Google Scholar
Keeney, G. L., & von Winterfeldt, D. (2010). Identifying and structuring the objectives of terrorists. Risk Analysis, 30(12), 1803–1816.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Keeney, R. L. (1992). Value-focused thinking: A path to creative decisionmaking. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Keeney, R. L. (1994). Using values in operations research. Operations Research, 42(5), 793–813.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lapan, H. E., & Sandler, T. (1993). Terrorism and signalling. European Journal of Political Economy, 9, 383–397.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lund, A. (2013). Who are the foreign fighters in Syria? An interview with Aaron Y. Zelin, December 2014, accessed through http://carnegieendowment.org/syriaincrISIL/?fa=53811.Google Scholar
McCormick, G. H. (2003). Terrorist decision making. Annual Review of Political Science, 6, 473–507.Google Scholar
Muller, E. N., & Opp, K.D. (1986). Rational choice and rebellious collective action. American Political Science Review, 80, 471–488.Google Scholar
Pop, V. (2015). Al Qaeda in fierce competition with Islamic State, EU official says. Wall Street Journal, online, released: March 21, 2015, accessed: June 10, 2015, through: http://www.wsj.com/articles/al-qaeda-in-fierce-competition-with-islamic-state-eu-official-says-1426931563.Google Scholar
Price, E. H., Jr. (1977). The strategy and tactics of revolutionary terrorism. Comparative Studies in Society and History, 19, 52–66.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rollins, J. (2011). Al Qaeda and affiliates: Historical perspective, global presence and implications for U.S. policy, Congressional Research Service, accessed through http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R41070_20100205.pdf.Google Scholar
Sandler, T., & Lapan, H.E. (1988). The calculus of dissent: An analysis of terrorists’ choice of targets. Synthese, 76, 245–261.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sandler, T., Tschirhart, J. T., & Cauley, J. (1983). A theoretical analysis of transnational terrorism. American Political Science Review, 77, 36–54.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Siebert, J., Keeney, G., Rosoff, H., & von Winterfeldt, D. (submitted). Comparative analysis of terrorists’ objectives hierarchies.Google Scholar
Siebert, J., von Winterfeldt, D., & John, R. (2016). Identifying and structuring the objectives of the “Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant” and its followers. Decision Analysis (INFORMS), 13(1), 26–50, http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/deca.2015.0324.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tullock, G. (1974). The social dilemma: The economics of war and revolution. Blacksburg: University of Virginia.Google Scholar
Wander, A. (2008). A history of terror: Al-Qaeda 1988–2008, The Guardian, online, accessed: July 13, 2008, through www.theguardian.com/world/2008/jul/13/history .alqaida.Google Scholar
Washington Times. (2014). Obama confesses: “We don’t have a strategy yet” for Islamic State, accessed: August 28, 2014, through www.washingtontimes .com/news/2014/aug/28/obama-admits-isil-dilemma-we-dont-have-strategy-ye/?page=all.Google Scholar
Waterman, H. (1981). Reasons and reason: Collective political activity in comparative and historical perspective. World Politics, 33, 554–589.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Waugh, W. L. (1983). The value in violence: Organization and political objectives of terrorist groups. Conflict Quarterly, 3, 5–19.Google Scholar
Zelin, A. (2014, June). The war between ISIS and al-Qaeda for supremacy of the global jihadist movement, Research Notes, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Number 20.Google Scholar
- 1
- Cited by