Published online by Cambridge University Press: 20 May 2021
In the pseudo-Platonic dialogue Axiochus, Socrates deploys a variety of arguments to soothe Axiochus’ fear of death. One of these is the ‘symmetry argument’ that tries to demonstrate that the state we will be in post mortem is no more harmful than the state we were in before birth. This argument is often associated with Epicureanism and with their commitment to the mortality of the soul, and it is therefore sometimes thought that Socrates’ use of it here is inconsistent with his commitment in the dialogue to the claim that each of us is in fact an immortal soul. This is also sometimes thought to show that the dialogue as a whole is clumsily constructed. I show how Socrates may deploy a symmetry argument and remain consistent with his other commitments.
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