Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 September 2009
Introduction
Imitation, or performing an act after perceiving it, has attracted the attention of researchers from many different disciplines. The present chapter addresses possible common neurocognitive mechanisms underlying perception and action in imitation. First, the transformation problem between actions perceived and actions performed will be outlined. Then, it is proposed that the neurocognitive mechanisms underlying perception and action in imitation, to some extent, may be one and the same. Neurophysiological evidence for this view, mostly deriving from single-cell studies regarding hand and mouth movement observation and execution, will be described. Also, a link to general cognitive psychology theories about stimulus-response couplings will be made. In the third section, recent tests of an action observation/execution matching system in so-called stimulus-response compatibility paradigms will be discussed. A recent fMRI study employing one of these paradigms will provide further evidence for the assumption that common neuro-cognitive mechanisms are underlying perception and action in imitation. Finally, the chapter will consider the impact of a direct matching system on the topic of the transformation problem in imitation. However, it will also point out the limitations of a system that directly matches actions observed and actions-to-be-executed at the motor act level.
The transformation problem of imitation: How can we do what we see?
Although imitation is well documented in different species, one question unresolved yet, is how a motor act is constructed from a perceived action performed by a model.
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