So far we have found ample reason to believe that the identity of mind is independent of that of body, (i) Hume's account of personal identity involves a succession of uniform relations of resemblance and cause and effect the contemplation of which the imagination confounds with perfect identity; external objects are at no point presupposed, (ii) Since the system of perceptions defined in Treatise I/i/§2 is premised in the account of external objects and substances in Treatise I/iv/§§2–5, the equation of the former with the mind of Treatise I/iv/§6 suggests that the latter can be known independently of body, (iii) Hume's claim on T73f. that causal relations are presupposed in order for identity to apply beyond the memory and the senses means that bodily identity would remain unknowable in their absence; by contrast, there is no need to advance beyond the perceptions of memory and senses for the discovery of personal identity (see T260ff.). Nevertheless, nothing prior to Treatise I/iv/§2, “Of scepticism with regard to the senses,” permits one to draw the stronger conclusion that the identity of mind is premised by that of body. But in that section one finds texts strongly suggesting that Hume did espouse this view. If so, it would have profound implications for how Hume's account of bodily identity should be understood and evaluated.