INTRODUCTION

The idea of flourishing has enjoyed a comeback in recent ethical theory, both from a historical and a systematic perspective. From a historical perspective, one finds a number of studies by scholars of ancient philosophy aiming to elucidate and defend the notion of flourishing; from a systematic perspective, the work of Thomas Hurka and Amartya Sen has contributed much toward the rehabilitation of the notion in contemporary ethical theory and discussion.

Of course, to speak of a comeback is to assume that the notion enjoyed an earlier life, that it was a significant component of ethical theory in the past. It is well-known that this is indeed the case: several moral philosophers of the past have advocated flourishing in one form or another in their attempts to explain the good, happiness, or virtue. Most often these philosophers understand flourishing in terms of perfection, thus advocating perfectionist theories of the good, happiness, or virtue. At least Plato, Aristotle, Marx, and Nietzsche are among those who have put forth ethical theories that give a prominent place to flourishing and are perfectionist in character.

In Greek philosophy, perfectionism and flourishing go hand in hand, and both are most often connected to a view about human nature or essence. It is almost a given in Greek philosophy that there is a human nature or essence and, of course, that there is only one human essence.