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5 - Disclosure

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 February 2010

Niamh Moloney
Affiliation:
London School of Economics and Political Science
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Summary

Disclosure and EC investor protection

The retail market disclosure regime

Disclosure, with its ‘self-help’ connotations, is strongly associated with the empowerment model. It forms a central element of current retail market policy internationally, reflecting the ingrained assumption that disclosure can support better decision-making and stronger market-based saving; this assumption is evident in the UK regime by the FSA's placing of clear information at the heart of its Treating Customers Fairly initiative and of its regulatory and supervisory strategies generally.

The post-FSAP EC retail market disclosure regime for the intermediated and product-based transactions which strongly characterize the EC retail market has two dimensions: investment products; and investment services. Product disclosure is primarily a function of the UCITS regime. But it is also addressed by MiFID's disclosure requirements for the ‘financial instruments’ in respect of which investment services are provided, and by the Prospectus Directive, particularly with respect to structured securities but also with respect to direct investments and execution-only sales generally. Services disclosure is governed by the Distance Marketing of Financial Services Directive and MiFID, which address marketing communications, pre-contractual and pre-service disclosure and best execution disclosure. Disclosure is, however, employed across MiFID; execution-only services, for example, can be offered only with respect to ‘non-complex’ products, which determination depends in part on whether ‘adequately comprehensive’ information is available such that the ‘average retail investor’ can make an informed judgment about the product (MiFID Level 2 Directive, Article 38(d)).

Type
Chapter
Information
How to Protect Investors
Lessons from the EC and the UK
, pp. 288 - 344
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2010

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  • Disclosure
  • Niamh Moloney, London School of Economics and Political Science
  • Book: How to Protect Investors
  • Online publication: 26 February 2010
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511674808.006
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  • Disclosure
  • Niamh Moloney, London School of Economics and Political Science
  • Book: How to Protect Investors
  • Online publication: 26 February 2010
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511674808.006
Available formats
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Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Disclosure
  • Niamh Moloney, London School of Economics and Political Science
  • Book: How to Protect Investors
  • Online publication: 26 February 2010
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511674808.006
Available formats
×