The central paradox of Indian politics in the 1950s and 1960s is that the party system, although highly differentiated in terms of programmes and doctrines, was unable to organize the mass electorate into clearly defined and separated sectors of social and regional support. With some exceptions, the political parties appeared to float above society, unable to establish a durable and electorally rewarding relationship with the groups whose interests they claimed to represent. Organizational activity, punctuated by membership drives, executive meetings and large plenary sessions, gave an impression of vitality, but behind these outward forms the party structures lacked substance.

Why were so many parties unable to establish secure social bases for themselves? Part of the explanation is that the Congress Party was very successful in its attempts to inhibit the development of opposition; as the governing party, it had unmatched resources for patronage and influence, which it could use to support or undermine local factions, and during the run-up to an election it could operate like a great machine, using its wealth and prestige to ensure that its candidates were well supported and well financed in every region. It tended not to rely on zones of safe seats or on established sitting members, but to campaign everywhere, and to compensate for some inevitable losses by taking seats from opposition incumbents and Independents. The result was a quite exceptional turnover of seats, which made it very difficult for non-Congress parties to anchor themselves in particular regions or localities.