Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Contributors
- Preface
- Introduction – Heuristics and Biases: Then and Now
- PART ONE THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL EXTENSIONS
- PART TWO NEW THEORETICAL DIRECTIONS
- PART THREE REAL-WORLD APPLICATIONS
- 33 The Hot Hand in Basketball: On the Misperception of Random Sequences
- 34 Like Goes with Like: The Role of Representativeness in Erroneous and Pseudo-Scientific Beliefs
- 35 When Less Is More: Counterfactual Thinking and Satisfaction among Olympic Medalists
- 36 Understanding Misunderstanding: Social Psychological Perspectives
- 37 Assessing Uncertainty in Physical Constants
- 38 Do Analysts Overreact?
- 39 The Calibration of Expert Judgment: Heuristics and Biases Beyond the Laboratory
- 40 Clinical versus Actuarial Judgment
- 41 Heuristics and Biases in Application
- 42 Theory-Driven Reasoning about Plausible Pasts and Probable Futures in World Politics
- References
- Index
42 - Theory-Driven Reasoning about Plausible Pasts and Probable Futures in World Politics
from PART THREE - REAL-WORLD APPLICATIONS
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Contributors
- Preface
- Introduction – Heuristics and Biases: Then and Now
- PART ONE THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL EXTENSIONS
- PART TWO NEW THEORETICAL DIRECTIONS
- PART THREE REAL-WORLD APPLICATIONS
- 33 The Hot Hand in Basketball: On the Misperception of Random Sequences
- 34 Like Goes with Like: The Role of Representativeness in Erroneous and Pseudo-Scientific Beliefs
- 35 When Less Is More: Counterfactual Thinking and Satisfaction among Olympic Medalists
- 36 Understanding Misunderstanding: Social Psychological Perspectives
- 37 Assessing Uncertainty in Physical Constants
- 38 Do Analysts Overreact?
- 39 The Calibration of Expert Judgment: Heuristics and Biases Beyond the Laboratory
- 40 Clinical versus Actuarial Judgment
- 41 Heuristics and Biases in Application
- 42 Theory-Driven Reasoning about Plausible Pasts and Probable Futures in World Politics
- References
- Index
Summary
This chapter explores the applicability of the error-and-bias literature to world politics by examining experts' expectations for the future as well as their explanations of the past. One set of studies tracks the reactions of experts to the apparent confirmation or disconfirmation of conditional forecasts of real-world events in real time. Key issues become: (1) the extent to which experts who “get it wrong” resort to various belief-system defenses; (2) the effectiveness of these defenses in helping experts who got it wrong to preserve confidence in their prior world views; (3) the rationality of these defenses. The other set of studies examines retrospective reasoning: the tightness of the connection between experts' conceptions of what would have happened in “counterfactual worlds” and their general ideological outlook. The key issue becomes the extent to which counterfactual reasoning about historical possibilities is theory-driven (predictable from abstract preconceptions) as opposed to data-driven (constrained by the peculiar “fact situation” of each episode). In these studies of both prospective and retrospective reasoning, individual differences in cognitive style and in conceptual orientations are important moderator variables. Although there is a general tendency among our experts to rely on theorydriven modes of reasoning and to fall prey to theory-driven biases such as overconfidence and belief perseverance, these tendencies are systematically more pronounced among experts with strong preferences for parsimony and explanatory closure.
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- Heuristics and BiasesThe Psychology of Intuitive Judgment, pp. 749 - 762Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2002
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