Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Contributors
- Preface
- Introduction – Heuristics and Biases: Then and Now
- PART ONE THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL EXTENSIONS
- 1 Extensional versus Intuitive Reasoning
- 2 Representativeness Revisited: Attribute Substitution in Intuitive Judgment
- 3 How Alike Is It? versus How Likely Is It?: A Disjunction Fallacy in Probability Judgments
- 4 Imagining Can Heighten or Lower the Perceived Likelihood of Contracting a Disease: The Mediating Effect of Ease of Imagery
- 5 The Availability Heuristic Revisited: Ease of Recall and Content of Recall as Distinct Sources of Information
- 6 Incorporating the Irrelevant: Anchors in Judgments of Belief and Value
- 7 Putting Adjustment Back in the Anchoring and Adjustment Heuristic
- 8 Self-Anchoring in Conversation: Why Language Users Do Not Do What They “Should”
- 9 Inferential Correction
- 10 Mental Contamination and the Debiasing Problem
- 11 Sympathetic Magical Thinking: The Contagion and Similarity “Heuristics”
- 12 Compatibility Effects in Judgment and Choice
- 13 The Weighing of Evidence and the Determinants of Confidence
- 14 Inside the Planning Fallacy: The Causes and Consequences of Optimistic Time Predictions
- 15 Probability Judgment across Cultures
- 16 Durability Bias in Affective Forecasting
- 17 Resistance of Personal Risk Perceptions to Debiasing Interventions
- 18 Ambiguity and Self-Evaluation: The Role of Idiosyncratic Trait Definitions in Self-Serving Assessments of Ability
- 19 When Predictions Fail: The Dilemma of Unrealistic Optimism
- 20 Norm Theory: Comparing Reality to Its Alternatives
- 21 Counterfactual Thought, Regret, and Superstition: How to Avoid Kicking Yourself
- PART TWO NEW THEORETICAL DIRECTIONS
- PART THREE REAL-WORLD APPLICATIONS
- References
- Index
12 - Compatibility Effects in Judgment and Choice
from PART ONE - THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL EXTENSIONS
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Contributors
- Preface
- Introduction – Heuristics and Biases: Then and Now
- PART ONE THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL EXTENSIONS
- 1 Extensional versus Intuitive Reasoning
- 2 Representativeness Revisited: Attribute Substitution in Intuitive Judgment
- 3 How Alike Is It? versus How Likely Is It?: A Disjunction Fallacy in Probability Judgments
- 4 Imagining Can Heighten or Lower the Perceived Likelihood of Contracting a Disease: The Mediating Effect of Ease of Imagery
- 5 The Availability Heuristic Revisited: Ease of Recall and Content of Recall as Distinct Sources of Information
- 6 Incorporating the Irrelevant: Anchors in Judgments of Belief and Value
- 7 Putting Adjustment Back in the Anchoring and Adjustment Heuristic
- 8 Self-Anchoring in Conversation: Why Language Users Do Not Do What They “Should”
- 9 Inferential Correction
- 10 Mental Contamination and the Debiasing Problem
- 11 Sympathetic Magical Thinking: The Contagion and Similarity “Heuristics”
- 12 Compatibility Effects in Judgment and Choice
- 13 The Weighing of Evidence and the Determinants of Confidence
- 14 Inside the Planning Fallacy: The Causes and Consequences of Optimistic Time Predictions
- 15 Probability Judgment across Cultures
- 16 Durability Bias in Affective Forecasting
- 17 Resistance of Personal Risk Perceptions to Debiasing Interventions
- 18 Ambiguity and Self-Evaluation: The Role of Idiosyncratic Trait Definitions in Self-Serving Assessments of Ability
- 19 When Predictions Fail: The Dilemma of Unrealistic Optimism
- 20 Norm Theory: Comparing Reality to Its Alternatives
- 21 Counterfactual Thought, Regret, and Superstition: How to Avoid Kicking Yourself
- PART TWO NEW THEORETICAL DIRECTIONS
- PART THREE REAL-WORLD APPLICATIONS
- References
- Index
Summary
One of the main ideas that has emerged from behavioral decision research is a constructive conception of judgment and choice. According to this view, preferences and beliefs are actually constructed – not merely revealed – in the elicitation process. This conception is entailed by findings that normatively equivalent methods of elicitation often give rise to systematically different responses (e.g., Slovic, Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein, 1982; Tversky, Sattath, & Slovic, 1988). To account for these data within a constructive framework, we seek explanatory principles that relate the characteristics of the task to the attributes of the objects under study. One such notion is the compatibility hypothesis, which states that the weight of a stimulus attribute is enhanced by its compatibility with the response.
The rationale for this hypothesis is twofold. First, noncompatibility between the input and the output requires additional mental operations, which often increase effort and error and may reduce impact. Second, a response mode may prime or focus attention on the compatible features of the stimulus. Common features, for example, are weighted more heavily in judgments of similarity than in judgments of dissimilarity, whereas distinctive features are weighted more heavily in judgments of dissimilarity (Tversky, 1977). Consequently, entities with many common and many distinctive features (e.g., East and West Germany) are judged as both more similar to each other and as more different from each other than entities with relatively fewer common and fewer distinctive features (e.g., Sri Lanka and Nepal).
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- Heuristics and BiasesThe Psychology of Intuitive Judgment, pp. 217 - 229Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2002
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