This chapter turns from the you of interpersonal understanding to the we of shared action. Drawing on Heidegger’s philosophy of action (as well as that of Merleau-Ponty and Dreyfus), I argue that we should conceptualise shared action on the basis of pre-reflective solicitations rather than deliberate acts guided by occurrent and propositionally structured intentions. In dialogue with Bratman, Gilbert, Schmid, and Zahavi, I show that Heidegger’s conception of existential selfhood – that is, the sense of self reflected back to us from worldly solicitations and saliences – enables us to account for several distinct types of shared action, depending on how the solicitation in question refers to a group of agents rather than a single agent. I further show that Heidegger’s notion of discourse [Rede] refers to the expressive (but not necessarily linguistic) and often unconscious process in which saliences are shared between people.