In this chapter, I clarify, contextualise, and reassess Heidegger’s ambiguous and polemical account of social cognition. Although commentators often take his critique of, for instance, empathy to be pretty straightforward, a closer look reveals that Heidegger makes a number of seemingly incoherent claims. To clarify this, I identify six different objections raised by Heidegger against theories of social cognition and then reassess who (among both historical and contemporary contenders) are, in fact, vulnerable to these objections. Drawing on Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, I then go on to develop a positive, Heideggerian account of social cognition. I show that Heidegger’s view has much in common with phenomenological empathy theories but that he departs from these by arguing that we must understand the other as exhibiting a practical comportment that constitutively depends on our shared environment. Finally, I consider how our understanding of our fellow Dasein differs from our understanding of nonhuman animals.