There were several different ways of bringing this book to a close. One way was to outline the reasons for accepting one of the theories of group rationality herein examined as unqualifiedly the best; but there is no such theory, for there are no such reasons. Another way was to demonstrate one of the theories as the least objectionable, but that task – and I am not at all sure that it is an unworthy task – left me without motivation. A third way was to list the virtues and vices of each theory and show how a concatenation of these virtues, without the attendant vices, can be welded into a single theory of group rationality; but it was doubtful if that could be accomplished in a single chapter. A fourth way was to highlight the key arguments of the book, but I saw little value in repeating them. Ultimately, I decided to present the cardinal problems of group rationality – nine in all – as a substantial body, not merely a filigree, and to color it from a distinctive point of view. Shaped by the arguments thus far, such a view might assist in our future inquiry into the subject of group rationality, if only as a view to argue against.

The skeptic in philosophy has standardly played the role of one who demands justification even when we are at the outermost limit of our philosophical investigations.