In this book, it is argued that legal time is a Janus-faced phenomenon because it is based on two complement and contradictory forms of time: human and clock time. Clock time is the standardized conception of time; its uniform, precise, and predictable character makes it particularly apt for control and regulation in law. Human time, however, is always the time of someone, it is characterized by temporality (past, present, future), it is finite, irreversible, and cannot be stopped. One of the aims of this book is to show how an indeterminacy in legal time is at work; stemming from the intricate relationship between clock time and human time. The strain that I describe in legal time follows from the fact that human time is structurally different from legal time, a problem that cannot be solved in legal time. Yet, it can be acknowledged, and taking into account the peculiar character of human time in itself has normative value.