The first two chapters of this book sought to set the historical and institutional contexts which have facilitated the rise of the PRC, and that have led to a complex relationship between the latter and the West. The third and fourth chapters, however, have sought to flip the perspective and to look at the challenges faced by China amidst growing engagement with a LIO dominated by the West. This final chapter looks at recent events by providing an illustration of the conundrum faced by some western countries in the making of their China policy. It shows how dealing with the PRC has stressed the balance between economic and security interests, required countries to operate a course correction after years in which economic interests were prioritized, and led to a degree of strategic ambiguity.

Since the early 2010s, when Obama formulated his “pivot to Asia” policy, the feeling that the world was already too small for both Washington and Beijing was tangible. Yet, in the second half of the decade it became clear that while the US, with Trump's hawkish approach, was at the forefront of what seemed to be an anti-China crusade, other countries followed the US. At times pressured by the White House, at times concerned for their domestic security and values, other members of the international community implicitly admitted that an acritical, two decades-long neoliberal policy towards the PRC was no longer viable. These countries all started to believe that the quality and intensity of exchanges with China required stricter rules, although implementing this principle remains challenging. Authoritative commentators coined the phrase “new Cold War” to describe wide-spreading tensions in Sino-American and Sino-western relations and to highlight what, over the past five years, has clearly become a negative spiral in them. However, in some cases it remains to be seen whether there has been a real, substantial shift away from neoliberalism in these countries, and from a China policy dictated by economic rather than security interests.