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6 - Property Rights, Knowledge Commons, and Blockchain Governance

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 December 2021

By
Darcy W. E. Allen ,
Chris Berg ,
Sinclair Davidson  and
Jason Potts
Edited by
Erwin Dekker  and
Pavel Kuchař
Erwin Dekker
Affiliation:
Mercatus Center, George Mason University, Virginia
Pavel Kuchař
Affiliation:
King's College London
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Summary

Knowledge about property rights is a commons that facilitates market exchange and economic coordination. The governance of that shared knowledge resource—the various formal and informal rules that maintain ledgers of property rights—ranges from community norms to formal state registries. In this chapter we make three contributions. First, we use the lens of knowledge commons theory to argue that knowledge about property rights is a shared resource. Second, we explore how that knowledge commons is governed—particularly relating to “rules in use”—might shift due to technological advances in distributed ledgers. Third, we argue that as blockchain augments and complements existing governance structures, it creates a more robust political economy.

Keywords

BlockchainKnowledge commonsGovernanceConsensus
Type
Chapter
Information
Governing Markets as Knowledge Commons , pp. 159 - 175
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2021

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