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2 - The Electoral Connection, Age 40

from Part I - Political Representation and Democratic Accountability

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 October 2016

By
R. Douglas Arnold
Edited by
Alan S. Gerber  and
Eric Schickler
Alan S. Gerber
Affiliation:
Yale University, Connecticut
Eric Schickler
Affiliation:
University of California, Berkeley
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Type
Chapter
Information
Governing in a Polarized Age
Elections, Parties, and Political Representation in America
 , pp. 15 - 34
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2016

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