Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Figures and Tables
- Acknowledgments
- 1 NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS AND GLOBAL CAPITAL: A RECASTING
- 2 FINANCIAL MARKET INFLUENCE ON GOVERNMENT POLICY: THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
- 3 FINANCIAL MARKET INFLUENCE IN DEVELOPED NATIONS: AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT
- 4 FINANCIAL MARKET–GOVERNMENT RELATIONS IN EMERGING MARKETS
- 5 POLITICS MEETS MARKETS: DOMESTIC RESPONSES TO FINANCIAL MARKET PRESSURES
- 6 ALTERNATIVE DOMESTIC RESPONSES: CHANGES TO FINANCIAL MARKET–GOVERNMENT RELATIONS
- 7 HISTORY REPEATING ITSELF? FINANCIAL MARKETS AND NATIONAL GOVERNMENT POLICIES BEFORE THE FIRST WORLD WAR
- 8 FINANCIAL MARKET–GOVERNMENT RELATIONS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
- APPENDIX 2.1 FINANCIAL MARKET INTERVIEWS
- APPENDIX 3.1 DATA DEFINITIONS AND SOURCES
- APPENDIX 3.2 FULL RESULTS FOR MACROINDICATORS MODEL
- APPENDIX 4.1 THE COMPONENTS OF THE SDDS
- APPENDIX 4.2 RATING AGENCY METHODOLOGIES
- APPENDIX 4.3 RATING AGENCY OUTCOMES, 1997
- APPENDIX 6.1 NATIONS IN CAPITAL CONTROLS DATA SET
- References
- Index
- Titles in the series
5 - POLITICS MEETS MARKETS: DOMESTIC RESPONSES TO FINANCIAL MARKET PRESSURES
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 14 January 2010
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Figures and Tables
- Acknowledgments
- 1 NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS AND GLOBAL CAPITAL: A RECASTING
- 2 FINANCIAL MARKET INFLUENCE ON GOVERNMENT POLICY: THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
- 3 FINANCIAL MARKET INFLUENCE IN DEVELOPED NATIONS: AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT
- 4 FINANCIAL MARKET–GOVERNMENT RELATIONS IN EMERGING MARKETS
- 5 POLITICS MEETS MARKETS: DOMESTIC RESPONSES TO FINANCIAL MARKET PRESSURES
- 6 ALTERNATIVE DOMESTIC RESPONSES: CHANGES TO FINANCIAL MARKET–GOVERNMENT RELATIONS
- 7 HISTORY REPEATING ITSELF? FINANCIAL MARKETS AND NATIONAL GOVERNMENT POLICIES BEFORE THE FIRST WORLD WAR
- 8 FINANCIAL MARKET–GOVERNMENT RELATIONS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
- APPENDIX 2.1 FINANCIAL MARKET INTERVIEWS
- APPENDIX 3.1 DATA DEFINITIONS AND SOURCES
- APPENDIX 3.2 FULL RESULTS FOR MACROINDICATORS MODEL
- APPENDIX 4.1 THE COMPONENTS OF THE SDDS
- APPENDIX 4.2 RATING AGENCY METHODOLOGIES
- APPENDIX 4.3 RATING AGENCY OUTCOMES, 1997
- APPENDIX 6.1 NATIONS IN CAPITAL CONTROLS DATA SET
- References
- Index
- Titles in the series
Summary
Governments can tax wealth in an open capital regime. … The reason they don't do this is because of domestic political concerns. … And governments need to realize that, by signing onto an open capital regime, they are signing on to certain constraints on their policy: they are making a deliberate choice, with foreseeable effects, so they should not complain about these effects in the future.
The presence of all these [international] constraints means it is not parliament or public opinion that constitutes the most important sounding board for government policy but, rather, markets, and especially financial ones. Astute government officials will therefore anticipate and attend to the reactions of markets, and not to those of legislators, interest groups, or the public.
How do domestic political factors interact with global economic forces, and with past choices regarding economic policy? The majority of this book is concerned with specifying the nature of financial market pressures on government policymaking. By providing a causal mechanism linking financial globalization with government policy outcomes, this endeavor greatly enhances our understanding of government policymaking in an era of financial globalization. In order to understand fully this linkage, and the process by which cross-national policy divergence occurs, however, a second causal mechanism – the effect of financial market pressures within domestic politics – is necessary. We need to connect events in global capital markets with changes in government policy, and we must consider how various domestic institutions and ideologies mediate these changes.
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- Information
- Global Capital and National Governments , pp. 157 - 198Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2003