One of the clearest and most frequently commented effects of the Russian invasion is that European governments have developed stronger defence and security policies. They have reacted to the evident threat coming directly from Russia as well as to a wider sense of risk and uncertainty. The war has triggered a process of European rearmament, after years in which the continent was losing hard power relative to other countries. NATO has returned to the forefront of regional security and the EU has accelerated its complementary contributions to strengthening defence capabilities. Much day-to-day debate has focused on European governments’ military supplies to Ukrainian forces, these expanding as the conflict has continued.

These changes mean that the postwar order is becoming a more securitized one. It will no longer be rooted in a peace project that minimizes military power as was the case during decades of European cooperative identity-building. The fusion of hard, geopolitical power with the maintenance of liberal order is one key element of an emerging geoliberal Europe. Still, there are unresolved questions about the political implications of such securitization and what it implies for European perspectives on postwar re-ordering. For now, European governments have begun a process of rearmament without a template for dovetailing such securitization with other pillars of European order.

DEFENDING EUROPE

In the wake of the war, European governments have poured huge amounts of money into their defence budgets and have cooperated in developing new military technology. Gone are the celebrated days of a non-military, civilian power Europe. The EU has doubled down on defending and protecting its own perimeter. Elements of hard security have crept into key areas of its external actions. Here, NATO has played lead role: a striking result of the war is that this organization has returned to the forefront of European order. A common argument is that continental rearmament is a necessary and overdue step towards European governments giving concrete backing to their new language of power and pursuing a properly robust sovereignty to underpin liberal order in Europe.

The move towards rearming Europe began very tentatively in the two or three years before the war. The economic impact of the eurozone crisis had caused many governments to reduce defence spending dramatically after 2009 and for most of the 2010s European military spending flatlined, while it increased fast in China, Russia and the Middle East.