Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of contributors
- Preface
- Chapter 1 Editor's introduction and overview
- Chapter 2 Disagreement in bargaining: Models with incomplete information
- Chapter 3 Reputations in games and markets
- Chapter 4 An approach to some noncooperative game situations with special attention to bargaining
- Chapter 5 Infinite-horizon models of bargaining with one-sided incomplete information
- Chapter 6 Choice of conjectures in a bargaining game with incomplete information
- Chapter 7 Analysis of two bargaining problems with incomplete information
- Chapter 8 Sequential bargaining mechanisms
- Chapter 9 The role of risk aversion in a simple bargaining model
- Chapter 10 Risk sensitivity and related properties for bargaining solutions
- Chapter 11 Axiomatic theory of bargaining with a variable population: A survey of recent results
- Chapter 12 Toward a focal-point theory of bargaining
- Chapter 13 Bargaining and coalitions
- Chapter 14 Axiomatic approaches to coalitional bargaining
- Chapter 15 A comment on the Coase theorem
- Chapter 16 Disclosure of evidence and resolution of disputes: Who should bear the burden of proof?
- Chapter 17 The role of arbitration and the theory of incentives
Preface
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 23 September 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of contributors
- Preface
- Chapter 1 Editor's introduction and overview
- Chapter 2 Disagreement in bargaining: Models with incomplete information
- Chapter 3 Reputations in games and markets
- Chapter 4 An approach to some noncooperative game situations with special attention to bargaining
- Chapter 5 Infinite-horizon models of bargaining with one-sided incomplete information
- Chapter 6 Choice of conjectures in a bargaining game with incomplete information
- Chapter 7 Analysis of two bargaining problems with incomplete information
- Chapter 8 Sequential bargaining mechanisms
- Chapter 9 The role of risk aversion in a simple bargaining model
- Chapter 10 Risk sensitivity and related properties for bargaining solutions
- Chapter 11 Axiomatic theory of bargaining with a variable population: A survey of recent results
- Chapter 12 Toward a focal-point theory of bargaining
- Chapter 13 Bargaining and coalitions
- Chapter 14 Axiomatic approaches to coalitional bargaining
- Chapter 15 A comment on the Coase theorem
- Chapter 16 Disclosure of evidence and resolution of disputes: Who should bear the burden of proof?
- Chapter 17 The role of arbitration and the theory of incentives
Summary
The readings in this volume are revised versions of papers presented at the Conference on Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining held June 27–30, 1983, at the University of Pittsburgh. Support for the conference was provided by the National Science Foundation and by the University of Pittsburgh.
The conference would not have been possible without the support at the University of Pittsburgh of Chancellor Wesley Posvar, Dean Jerome Rosenberg, and my colleague Professor Mark Perlman. Michael Rothschild was instrumental in arranging the NSF support.
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- Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining , pp. ix - xPublisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1985
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