Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of tables
- Preface
- Acknowledgments
- Chapter 1 The German problem and linkage politics
- Chapter 2 The long road to Moscow: the origins of linkage, 1955
- Chapter 3 From diplomacy to trade: 1955–1958
- Chapter 4 Trade and the Berlin crisis: 1958–1961
- Chapter 5 The pipe embargo: 1962–1963
- Chapter 6 The failure of linkage: 1964–1968
- Chapter 7 Brandt's Ostpolitik and the Soviet response: 1969–1970
- Chapter 8 From Moscow to Bonn: the consolidation of Ostpolitik and Westpolitik, 1970–1980
- Chapter 9 Beyond Ostpolitik and Westpolitik: the economics of detente
- Chapter 10 Normalization and the future of Soviet–West German relations
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index
Chapter 5 - The pipe embargo: 1962–1963
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 14 January 2010
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of tables
- Preface
- Acknowledgments
- Chapter 1 The German problem and linkage politics
- Chapter 2 The long road to Moscow: the origins of linkage, 1955
- Chapter 3 From diplomacy to trade: 1955–1958
- Chapter 4 Trade and the Berlin crisis: 1958–1961
- Chapter 5 The pipe embargo: 1962–1963
- Chapter 6 The failure of linkage: 1964–1968
- Chapter 7 Brandt's Ostpolitik and the Soviet response: 1969–1970
- Chapter 8 From Moscow to Bonn: the consolidation of Ostpolitik and Westpolitik, 1970–1980
- Chapter 9 Beyond Ostpolitik and Westpolitik: the economics of detente
- Chapter 10 Normalization and the future of Soviet–West German relations
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
From the standpoint of the U.S., the [CoCom embargo] system has been intricately interwoven into our overall strategic thinking about the cold war and in our overall cold war posture. Trade denial is looked upon as an effective weapon of cold war regardless of how large or how small the quantities of goods involved may be, on the simple assumption that since the U.S. is richer than the USSR any trade between the two must necessarily help the USSR more than the U.S. and hence must improve the relative power position of the USSR. Trade denial has also come to be an important symbol of our cold war resolve and purpose and of our moral disapproval of the USSR.
Walt Whitman Rostow, 1963Of course, anything one pleases can be regarded as strategic material, even a button, because it can be sewn onto a soldier's pants. A soldier will not wear pants without buttons, since otherwise he would have to hold them up with his hands. And then what can he do with his weapon? If one reasons thus, then buttons also are a particularly strategic material. But if buttons really had such great importance and we could find no substitute for them, then I am sure that our soldiers would even learn to keep their pants up with their teeth, so that their hands would be free to hold weapons.
Nikita S. Khrushchev, 1963The most controversial example of negative linkage in West German–Soviet relations prior to 1980 was an American order forbidding the Germans to honor a sales contract to sell largediameter pipe to the USSR.
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- Information
- From Embargo to OstpolitikThe Political Economy of West German-Soviet Relations, 1955–1980, pp. 93 - 126Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1982