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Introduction

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 January 2010

Elliott Sober
Affiliation:
University of Wisconsin, Madison
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Summary

Philosophers have tried to learn from science in two quite different ways. First, the contents of particular scientific theories have thrown light on philosophical problems. For example, philosophers interested in the nature of space and time have found much of interest in relativity theory. As sometimes happens in the history of thought, a problem that begins its life as a problem in philosophy later turns out to receive illumination from a body of scientific results. Philosophy then has to catch up with the news from outside.

A second avenue of influence develops when philosophers contemplate the character of science itself. Here scientific theories serve as examples. Relativity theory says nothing about what scientific knowledge is; its subject is space, time, and motion, not the nature of inquiry. Still, the hypotheses of relativity theory have been an important point of reference for philosophers seeking to understand how the human mind is able to grasp a reality outside itself.

I've called this collection of papers From a Biological Point of View because it is biology – particularly the theory of evolution – that has performed, in my own work, the two functions just described. I believe that the contents of biological theories speak to problems that first saw the light of day as problems in philosophy.

Type
Chapter
Information
From a Biological Point of View
Essays in Evolutionary Philosophy
, pp. 1 - 7
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1994

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  • Introduction
  • Elliott Sober, University of Wisconsin, Madison
  • Book: From a Biological Point of View
  • Online publication: 14 January 2010
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511624940.001
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  • Introduction
  • Elliott Sober, University of Wisconsin, Madison
  • Book: From a Biological Point of View
  • Online publication: 14 January 2010
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511624940.001
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Introduction
  • Elliott Sober, University of Wisconsin, Madison
  • Book: From a Biological Point of View
  • Online publication: 14 January 2010
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511624940.001
Available formats
×