As we mark the 40th anniversary of the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) — which have been variously described as “an obligation to consult”, a “minilateral defence coalition”, and even an “alliance” — and attempt to assess its place in Asia's changing strategic environment, it is worth beginning with the provision of some historical context. This will be attempted through a brief overview of New Zealand's attitudes towards the FPDA and the place which it has occupied in New Zealand's defence policy and approach to regional security during the Arrangements' lifetime. The main features of the current and likely future strategic environment, as they are perceived by New Zealand, will then be outlined through an examination of the recently released Defence White Paper. The FPDA's role in this strategic environment will subsequently be analysed before the chapter concludes with an assessment of whether or not it has continued utility in that environment and what its place is (if any) in the regional security architecture.

In advance of a meeting of the five powers in June 1968, the Cabinet had decided that New Zealand needed to “avoid any commitments of a long-term or specific nature and discourage any disposition on the part of Malaysia and Singapore to look to Australia and New Zealand to pull their chestnuts out of the fire”. This evident desire to avoid over commitment was also readily apparent in the wake of the April 1971 meeting of the five countries’ prime ministers at which they agreed to the eventual replacement of the Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement with the FPDA. That the Arrangements were to be no more than a commitment to consult was emphatically stated by New Zealand's Prime Minister, Keith Holyoake.

After a decade of operation, and at a time when efforts were underway to revitalize the FPDA, a distinct lack of enthusiasm was also apparent; at least as far as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was concerned.