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8 - A political economy perspective on common supervision in the Eurozone

Observations on some strengths and weaknesses of the SSM

from Part I - Micro- and macro-prudential regulation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 August 2015

By
Tobias H. Tröger
Edited by
Ester Faia ,
Andreas Hackethal ,
Michael Haliassos  and
Katja Langenbucher
Ester Faia
Affiliation:
Goethe-Universität Frankfurt Am Main
Andreas Hackethal
Affiliation:
Goethe-Universität Frankfurt Am Main
Michael Haliassos
Affiliation:
Goethe-Universität Frankfurt Am Main
Katja Langenbucher
Affiliation:
Goethe-Universität Frankfurt Am Main
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Type
Chapter
Information
Financial Regulation
A Transatlantic Perspective
 , pp. 167 - 192
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2015

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