BACKGROUND

At around midnight on June 3, 1978, a seventeen-and-a-half-year-old boy named Michael and his two friends approached a sixteen-and-a-half-year-old girl named Sharon and her sister at a California bus stop. According to Sharon's testimony, Michael and Sharon walked to some railroad tracks, and then over to a bush. Michael began to kiss Sharon, who at first responded by kissing him back. Sharon then asked Michael to stop and slow down. Although he agreed to stop, he did not do so until Sharon's sister and Michael's friends rejoined them.

After the others left, Sharon and Michael walked to a park, sat down on a bench, and began kissing again. As they were lying on the bench, Michael told Sharon to take her pants off. When Sharon verbally refused and tried to stand up, Michael struck her in the face with his fist two or three times. Sharon testified, “I just said to myself ‘Forget it,’ and I let him do what he wanted to do ….” Michael took Sharon's pants off and had sexual intercourse with her.

Rather than charge Michael with rape, the State of California prosecuted him under its statutory rape statute. At the time, this offense punished only unlawful sexual intercourse with a woman under 18. Men or boys who had sex with female minors were therefore subject to criminal charges that women and girls who had sex with male minors escaped. Michael challenged the statute as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment based on its disparate treatment of men and women. The trial court, the California Court of Appeal, and the California Supreme Court all upheld the statute. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed as well.

ORIGINAL OPINION

The Petitioner's argument reflected a growing backlash against the paternalism of statutory rape laws intended to protect the chastity of young women. Under this view, gender-specific statutory rape laws reinforce outmoded norms about both male and female sexuality, framing women as passive recipients or resisters of male sexual urges. According to the Petitioner, upholding such stereotypes would conflict with Court precedent that the legislature may not justify sex-based distinctions with “overbroad generalizations based on sex which are entirely unrelated to any differences between men and women or which demean the ability or social status of the affected class.”