For the past couple of decades, issues concerning the nature of the mind have held center stage in philosophy. Traditional philosophers of mind, philosophers of psychology, cognitive scientists, and metaphysicians have approached the mind with the conviction that the mind is the brain: Whatever mental states there are ultimately should be understood as states of an individual's brain. Typically, philosophers have seen their task as one of working out the details of this conception.

In this book, I propose an alternative approach to the mind – one compatible both with scientific study, of the mind and with the assumption of materialism. Several years ago, I published a critique of the dominant assumptions about the mind, Saving Belief: A Critique of Physicalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987). Here I try to deepen the critique and to offer a constructive proposal that, I hope, will contribute to a different way of conceiving of the mind.

Explaining Attitudes is the outcome of several years of lecturing at colleges and universities, participating in conferences, and publishing articles in journals. So a number of the ideas have not only been market-tested (so to speak) but also transformed by the comments and criticisms of many people. I am especially indebted to Derk Pereboom for his patient and perceptive reading of multiple drafts of this book and to Gareth B. Matthews and Katherine Sonderegger for searching discussion of a wide range of philosophical issues.