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7 - Socratic paradox and Stoic theory

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2012

T. H. Irwin
Affiliation:
Cornell University
Stephen Everson
Affiliation:
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
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Summary

Reactions to Stoic ethics

Stoic ethical doctrines provoke severe criticism from both ancient and modern readers. The criticism, however, expresses two sharply opposed views of the character and implications of Stoicism. These opposed views appear already in Cicero's comments on Stoicism, and they have affected interpretation and criticism of the Stoic position ever since.

Some critics attack the apparently extravagant, indeed outrageous, character of the Stoic conclusions. In the view of these critics, someone who actually accepted and practised Stoic doctrines would be so alien to us that he would be inhuman. Critics normally rest the charge of inhumanity on two features of Stoicism: (1) Since all reputed goods and evils except virtue and vice are indifferents, the sage sees no reason to be strongly concerned about anything other than virtue and vice. (2) The sage is free of all emotions, and so has no non-rational motive for being strongly concerned about anything.

When Cicero defends Lucius Murena in court, he seeks to undermine the effects of Cato's damaging and credible testimony against Murena, by ridiculing Cato's well-known Stoicism:

For there was a man of outstanding intellect, Zeno, the followers of whose doctrines are called Stoics. His opinions and precepts are of the following sort. The sage is never moved by favour; he never forgives anyone's offence; no one except a foolish and trivial person is merciful; a real man is never moved or mollified by pleas; only sages are wise; only they are handsome, however disfigured; only they are rich, however sunk in beggary; only they are kings, however sunk in slavery. […]

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Ethics , pp. 151 - 192
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1998

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